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ABSTRACT
The impact of design-to-cost on naval ship design as
implemented in the design of the Patrol Frigate is examined
in two areas: the management or control of constrained
design parameters, and the resulting ship design produced
under the constraints of cost, manning, and displacement.
The naval ship design process is reviewed, discussing
the changes in design methodology brought about by the
Laird/Packard/Zumwalt weapon systems acquisition philosophies.
The management of the Patrol Frigate design is discussed,
concentrating on the effort to control ship size. The
evolution of the Patrol Frigate is followed from the deter-
mination of the requirements for a new ship through the
design effort conducted by the Naval Ship Engineering
Center.
The naval ship design aspects of the Patrol Frigate
are examined. The effort to keep ship displacement below
the given goal is examined. The Patrol Frigate is compared
with similar U.S. Navy ships to determine the differences
between the PF and other recent ship designs. The austerity
decisions are quantified and analyzed to determine the
effect of these decisions on the PF design.
Conclusions are drawn as to the effectiveness of design
constraints in reaching a displacement goal, the management
of the constraints, the role of the ship designer and the
ship customer, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the future
of design-to-cost.
Thesis Supervisor: Clark Graham
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The Patrol Frigate (PF) is an escort destroyer,
designed to provide protection for Navy replenishment and
amphibious ships, and military and merchant cargo ships and
tankers. Although the PF is a multipurpose ship, the ship's
design emphasizes defense against enemy aircraft and missile
attacks, with a secondary anti-submarine capability. (29)
(NOTE: Numbers refer to references at the end of this thesis.)
The studies leading to the design of this ship were
initiated in September 1970. The ship design continued from
1970 through 1975. The keel for the lead ship in the class
was laid in early 1975, and the first ship is to be
delivered in 1977. This ship was called the Patrol Escort
through the ship conceptual design phase, the Patrol
Frigate (PF109 class) through most of the detail design
phase, and is now known as the Guided Missile Frigate
(FFG-7 class) . For consistency the term Patrol Frigate (PF)
is used throughout this paper.
The Patrol Frigate is the first Navy ship design to be
initiated under the administration of Laird and Packard in
the Defense Department and Admiral E. Zumwalt as Chief of
Naval Operations. Under the guidance of these men, the
design-to-cost philosophy applied to naval ships evolved

parallel to the Patrol Frigate design and acquisition.
Leopold, Jons, and Drewry describe this philosophy in
their paper, "Design-to-Cost of Naval Ships". (8)
This paper examines the design-to-cost philosophy as
implemented in the design of the Patrol Frigate with the
use of design constraints on cost, manning, and displacement.
The purpose of design constraints can be shown by quoting
the PF program objectives during the conceptual phase:
"The major objectives of the Patrol Escort
Program are to define ship characteristics and
performance requirements, to minimize ship size
and cost consistent with mission requirements, to
estimate total program costs with accuracy, and to
produce the patrol escort ships at or below the
program cost estimates. " (47)
This purpose was rephrased in the Patrol Frigate Ship
acquisition plan as:
"The major objectives of the PF program are to
minimize ship size and cost consistent with mission
requirements, to estimate total program costs with
accuracy and realism, and to produce the PF ships
at or below program cost estimates. " (49)
The primary objective of the Patrol Frigate program is
to reduce follow ship acquisition cost; however, most
engineers and naval architects involved in naval ship
design have had little involvement in the cost process
and would be unable to design effectively to a cost budget.
Therefore, other, more readily understood parameters, such
as manning, space, and weight, are used as design constraints.
Thus a more accurate term for describing design-to-cost is
constrained ship design. In this thesis constrained ship
design is used synonymously with the more common term,
design-to-cost.

This thesis examines the effect of constraints on the
design of the Patrol Frigate in order to answer the
question, "What is the impact of constraint on the Patrol
Frigate?"
This question is addressed in two major areas: the
management or control of the constrained parameters, and
the resulting ship design produced under the constraints
of cost, manning, and displacement.
Chapter I provides background material, reviewing the
development of the design-to-cost philosophy to determine
how this philosophy differs from that of other ship designs,
Chapter II discusses the management of naval ship design
under the design-to-cost philosophy. The naval ship design
process is reviewed, including the changes in design
methodology brought about by the Laird/Packard/Zumwalt
weapon system acquisition philosophies. The management of
the Patrol Frigate design is discussed, concentrating on
the efforts to control ship size. The evolution of PF is
followed from the determination of the requirements of a
new ship through the design effort conducted by the Naval
Ship Engineering Center (NAVSEC)
.
Chapter III examines the naval ship design aspects of
the Patrol Frigate. The effort to keep weight below the
given goal is examined, and the decisions to keep the
weight and cost of the PF low are presented. The Patrol
Frigate is compared with similar U.S. Navy ships to see
10

how the PF is different from other recent designs. The
austerity decisions are quantified to determine the effect
of these decisions on the PF design. Conclusions are
drawn as to the effectiveness of design-to-cost and the
role of the designer and the customer, the Chief of Naval
Operations. Chapter V briefly outlines the progress of
design-to-cost since the PF and the prospects for future
constrained ship designs.
Although the final judgment on the effect of design-
to-cost on the Patrol Frigate will not be known until the
ship is built and operated at sea, several conclusions are
drawn from the design effort to date.
1.2 Background
Historically naval ship design has consisted of the
operator providing the design agent with the desired ship
characteristics and the design agent optimizing ship mission
performance within stated requirements. Cost was considered
a dependent variable.
In the MacNamara era of systems analysis, cost was
included as a major parameter in the design process. Ship
design was based on meeting performance criteria at the
lowest life-cycle cost. Life-cycle cost optimization was
abandoned early in the Laird/Packard administration for a
multitude of reasons. The large cost overruns in weapons
system acquisition programs, the inability to predict life-
cycle costs accurately, the increased visibility of the
11

Defense Department budget, the increased criticism of the
Defense Department objectives originating in the opposition
to the Vietnam War, the increased cost of major weapon
systems due to increases in system complexity and the
effects of inflation, and the increased demand for Federal
funding to solve social problems led to the abandonment of
the Total Package Procurement method of defense systems
acquisition. (NOTE: Total Package Procurement and other
Weapons System Acquisition policies under MacNamara are
examined in detail in the Report of the President's Blue
Ribbon Defense Panel, July 1970.)
Department of Defense Directive 5000.1 "Acquisition
of Major Defense Systems", (21) superceded the Total
Package Procurement Directives and provided Defense
Department policy and guidance for ship acquisition programs
DOD Directive 5000.1 produced several changes in weapon
systems acquisition, including the separation of system
development and production efforts, "fly-before-buy"
requirements, the reaffirmation of the Development Concept
Paper (DCP) and the Defense System Acquisition Review
Council (DSARC) , and the inclusion of technical risk as a
major design consideration. This thesis will discuss one
aspect of the acquisition policy established by DOD
Directive 5000.1, as set forth in paragraph IV, C.2:(21)
12

"Cost parameters shall be established which
consider the cost of acquisition and ownership;
discrete cost elements (eg. , unit production
cost, operating and support cost) shall be trans-
lated into "design to" requirements. System
development shall be continuously evaluated
against these requirements. Practical tradeoffs
shall be made between system capability, cost,
and schedule. Traceabiiity of estimates and
costing factors, including those for economic
escalation, shall be maintained."
The requirements for establishing cost parameters
were further defined in SECNAVINST 5000.1 (50) which
implemented DOD Directive 5000.1 within the Department of
the Navy. The SECNAV Instruction states that: "Cost
parameters shall be established to reflect the cost of
acquisition and ownership. Ownership costs will include
life-cycle costing."
Further definition and guidance in the implementation
of the design-to concept was promulgated in NAVMAT P-5242,
Joint Design-to-Cost Guide. (27) According to the Joint
Design-to-Cost Guide, unit production cost must become a
primary design parameter. This policy, of course, is a
reversal of the past practice of optimizing total life-
cycle cost under the Total Package Procurement method of
ship acquisition. The Joint Design-to-Cost Guide cautions
against using unit cost as the sole driving consideration
in systems acquisition. "Acquisition cost reduction must
not be achieved at the expense of increased ownership costs
or through the sacrifice of performance essential for
mission accomplishment. " (27)
13

Design-to-cost is defined as a process which uses
unit cost goals as thresholds for managers and as design
parameters for engineers. This cost goal is divided into
unit production cost goals by the Program Manager, to be
provided to the contractors and in-house managers for the
appropriate subsystem. The designated cost goal represents
the amount that the government, at some level of the bureau-
cracy, has decided that it can afford (is willing and able)
to pay for a unit of military equipment or major subsystem
which meets established and measurable performance require-
ments. (27)
The design-to-cost concept is aimed at a reduction in
cost, rather than a justification of cost after completion
of a design to a performance level. This concept requires
considerable emphasis in the management of the design
effort to maintain costs below the pre-determined level.
The Program Manager must be given the flexibility to provide
the best possible design which performs the required mission
within the established cost goal. Unit production cost must
be related to an economic production schedule and the
minimum number of essential performance requirements. If
the iterative design process cannot achieve the desired
cost constraint, then "there must be a willingness to trade
off desired performance to achieve the cost goal while
assuring that a viable weapons system design is obtained". (27)
14

The Joint Design-to-Cost Guide requires that other
costs be considered in the weapons system acquisition
process. Adequate developmental funds must be made
available so that system and subsystem redesign can be used
when necessary to decrease total production cost. Support
hardware and services such as crew training and critical
spares, normally included in the production contract,
should not be arbitrarily reduced to achieve low unit
production costs. Although life-cycle cost should not be
sacrificed to meet the unit production cost, schedule, and
performance goals, the Joint Design-to-Cost Guide
recognizes the difficulty in determining life-cycle cost by
stating that "Wherever quantifiable life-cycle cost can be
effectively estimated, strong emphasis will be placed upon
its inclusion in the acquisition process. " (27)
The concept of design-to-cost departs from previous
design philosophies in two major areas:
1) Acquisition costs (defined in a very narrow
sense) and not life cycle costs are
optimized.
2) Ship design is not performance optimized.
Performance must be balanced against cost.
As discussed above, the directives which control the
acquisition process acknowledge the importance of life-cycle
cost, but do not present guidelines for the tradeoff between
life-cycle and acquisition cost. Because acquisition cost
15

is relatively easy to define and is one of the more visible
cost quantities, this value is used as the cost goal or
constraint. When conflicts occur, other, less visible costs
will undoubtedly be sacrified to maintain the project cost
within the stated goal. This reaction is basic to human
nature, but can increase the total cost of the ship to the
Navy. Increases in the operating and maintenance costs will
leave less money available for future ship acquisition
projects.
The idea that a ship design does not need to produce
a maximum performance vehicle is new with the design-to-
cost philosophy. The guidance on cost/performance tradeoffs
is vague and can mean whatever is convenient. In the
examples quoted above: "There must be a willingness to
trade off desired performances to achieve a cost goal,"
but, "Acquisition cost reduction must not be achieved . . .
through the sacrifice of performance essential for mission
accomplishment." The Chief of Naval Operations, speaking
for the men who must fight in these ships, must decide
how much he is willing to pay and how much performance he
is willing to give up to reach his cost goal. He must be
flexible enough to change his performance and cost goals
as the ship is defined during the design process and the




The guidance higher management gives to the Ship
Acquisition Manager (SHAPM) is full of philosophy, buzz
words, and sweeping generalizations. This guidance is
lacking in solid directives as to the methods for control
of cost. This thesis examines how part of that philosophy
was executed in one ship design, the Patrol Frigate (PF)
.
The Patrol Frigate is the first Navy ship to be
designed under the "design-to-cost" and fly-before-buy"
concepts set forth in DOD Directive 5000.1. The PF is the
first "low mix" ship to be designed under the new high/low
concept of ship acquisition. (This concept is explained in
Chapter II.) The majority of the ship requirements and the
design and acquisition decisions were based on a system that
was not formally promulgated. The first design constraints
were formally imposed on the PF design on June 1971,
although DOD Directive 5000.1 was not promulgated until
July 1971, SECNAVINST 5000.1 was not promulgated until
March 1972, and the Joint Design-to-Cost Guide NAVMAT P-5242
was not promulgated until October 1973. Many of the
experiences of the Patrol Frigate acquisition were
incorporated into these directives. The study of the PF




MANAGEMENT OF NAVAL SHIP DESIGN
This chapter discusses the control of naval ship design
from the limited aspect of the control of the design of the
ship system. The control of other aspects of the acquisi-
tion process, such as the control of concurrent subsystem
development, fiscal control of the ship design effort,
risk management, and integrated logistics support are not
addressed.
The design process, as envisioned for future design-
to-cost ships, is presented first to provide a basis for
comparison with the PF project. This design methodology
has grown out of recent experiences with the "design-to-
cost" and "fly-before-buy" philosophies since the promul-
gation of DOD Directive 5000.1.
The Patrol Frigate design and acquisition has proceeded
as a part of the evolution of these philosophies, and this
design procedure has relied heavily on the PF experience.
The second part of this chapter discusses the control of
the design of the Patrol Frigate, from a determination of




2.1 Naval Ship Design Process (20,32,52,60)
A review of the naval ship design process is necessary
in order to be able to discuss the PF ship design.
Ship design is an iterative process, usually described
in the literature by reference to the overworked ship
design spiral. In each design phase the engineering
studies are repeated to a greater level of detail, assump-
tions are verified or corrected, and a new, more complete
baseline is established.
Naval ship design is divided into five distinct
stages, which can be described in very simplified terms as:
1) Feasibility studies—Performance/cost tradeoffs
2) Conceptual design—Definition of ship system,
including sizing of the platform
3) Preliminary design—Subsystem tradeoff and
engineering definition of ship
4) Contract design—Validation of design and
preparation of contracting specifications
5) Detail design—Construction drawings and
procurement specifications for contractor
furnished equipment (CFE)
The sequence of these five phases is shown graphically
in Figure 2.1. The terminology used in part of the Patrol
Frigate design is different from that described here and is
also shown in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.2 shows these design
phases in more detail.
Feasibility studies are performed to establish cost vs.
performance tradeoffs and to identify these tradeoffs in a











































































































































































































target cost. The target cost is based on a subjective
analysis of the type of ship desired, the number of ships
expected in the class, and what price ship will be
acceptable to higher authority within the Navy, Department
of Defense, and to the Congress. Feasibility studies ask
the questions, "What if?" and "How much?".
For conventional ship types there is a broad technical
base upon which to draw. This technical base has been
incorporated into Ship Synthesis Models and computer ship
design programs, such as DD-07 for destroyer type ships.
Ship design alternatives can be constructed to determine
the effect of changes in speed, range, payload, and other
performance characteristics. Using a Synthesis Model, 50
to 300 ship designs are usually evaluated. Marginal costs
are frequently calculated to allow the customer to see the
effects of changes in ship design parameters. For a
conventional ship type, size, cost, and payload are the
real questions, not the feasibility of the ship. Where
ship requirements are well defined, feasibility studies
can be done to within 5% accuracy in ship weight; however,
absolute accuracy is not required during the feasibility
studies. (32)
At the end of feasibility studies a whole range of
ship synthesis model designs with Class E or F cost
estimates is presented to the customer. (Cost estimating
classifications are defined in Appendix B.) The Chief of
22

Naval Operations selects that combination of cost and
performance that best meets his needs and his resources,
and these characteristics are used as a basis for the
conceptual design phase.
The purpose of conceptual design is to determine an
absolute size and cost of the desired ship. Ship geometry
is established, main propulsion machinery is selected, and
an electrical power analysis is performed. Principal
weapon systems are located to reduce arrangement problems,
but combat system integration is not performed. Space and
weight budgets are established. Platform subsystem trade-
offs are not performed; standard approaches to subsystem
design are assumed. Any major technical risks associated
with the design must be resolved in order to produce valid
cost and weight estimates.
The draft Top Level Requirements (TLR) is developed
by OPNAV and the SHAPM. The TLR is a broad qualitative
description of the ship, which outlines the minimum
essential performance characteristics acceptable to the
customer (CNO)
.
The total ship design, called the conceptual baseline,
is reviewed to ensure that the design produces a balanced
ship. With the development of a baseline design on which




The conceptual baseline should have a Class D cost
estimate, which becomes the basis for the CNO cost goal,
a firm price which should not be exceeded without CNO
approval. In the PF, the conceptual design effort included
many feasibility studies, and the conceptual baseline cost
estimate was a Class F or "ballpark" estimate.
It is important to have an accurate estimate of ship
size at the completion of conceptual design in a design-
to-cost ship. Initial cost estimates are based on displace-
ment, weapon systems (payload) , and propulsion machinery.
If the estimated cost of the ship at the end of the concep-
tual study is significantly different from the original
target cost, the feasibility and weapons effectiveness
studies should be re-evaluated to determine if the perfor-
mance features can be changed. The conceptual baseline is
used as a basis for the preliminary design cost goal (or,
in the PF, the cost constraint) . If the conceptual baseline
produces an unreasonably low cost target, the ship designers
will have difficulty in producing a ship within the stated
goals, as in the PF. If the conceptual baseline produces
too high an estimate, the design team may not design to the
lowest possible cost and weight, as in the Sea Control
Ship. (52)
The conceptual design phase is the single most important
phase in the design-to-cost cycle. (46) The decisions which
have the greatest impact on cost are made at this time. The
24

most significant decisions include selection of ship's
speed and endurance, which establishes the propulsion plant
requirements, and selection of the ship's weapons and
sensors, which establishes combat systems and combat systems
support requirements. The basic problem is maintaining
restraint in the establishment of mission, ship performance,
and payload requirements, so that further design development
can reasonably be expected to produce a viable ship within
the given cost constraints. The impact of mission and
payload requirements on the ship design must be kept
continually in mind to ensure that the minimum performance
requirements are established.
At the completion of conceptual design, two outputs
should have been produced: 1) the best compromise between
speed, range, and payload vs. cost from feasibility studies
and companion military effectiveness studies; 2) absolute
size and cost of the platform. These design parameters
should only be changed through subsystem tradeoffs in
subsequent phases of ship design or through the process
of combat system integration.
At the completion of conceptual design, the ship
proposal is presented to the DSARC, the Defense Systems
Acquisition Review Council. DSARC membership consists of
the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, the
Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Comptroller)
,
(Installa-
tion and Logistics), (Intelligence), and (Programs Analysis
25

and Evaluation), and the Director, Telecommunications and
Command and Control Systems. The program is presented to
DSARC in the Development Concept Paper (DCP) , and DSARC
recommends continuation or cancellation of the program to
the Secretary of Defense. The purpose of this presentation,
known as DSARC I, is to obtain approval for program initiation
or the commencement of preliminary design.
The purpose of preliminary design is to develop the
ship design to the subsystem level. The given character-
istics are re-evaluated, subsystem trade-offs are conducted,
and a functional baseline (FBL) is completed. Considerable
detailed engineering takes place during this phase of
ship design.
All platform subsystems are sized, based on the actual
ship support they must provide, and subsystem trade-offs
may produce a change in ship's size, weight, and cost.
Much of the subsystem development that was previously done
during contract design is now part of preliminary design.
It is necessary to reach this level of- detail earlier in
the ship design in order to carry out meaningful subsystem
tradeoff studies. Preliminary design results in a complete
engineering definition of the ship.
Effective cost visibility is lost during most of the
preliminary design phase. (20) There is a weight accounting
budget for individual systems, but the design as a whole
ship is not firm until after the design freeze during the
26

latter part of preliminary design. System tradeoff studies
are conducted on the basis of cost deltas, marginal cost
factors which relate follow ship cost changes with
changes in manning, weight, and space. In practice this
has been less than completely effective. Detailed cost
data is not readily available, and many engineers are
reluctant to deal in terms of cost figures of any kind. (20)
Configuration control is the key to establishing and
maintaining effective control over a ship design. To date
NAVSEC has applied formal configuration control procedures
on four ship design projects, the Patrol Frigate (PF) , Sea
Control Ship (SCS), Anti-Air Warfare Destroyer (DG-AEGIS)
,
and Fleet Oiler (AG— 177 class) . This section outlines
configuration control as it should be carried out, based on
the experiences of these four designs.
Configuration control should be based on two separate
categories of design parameters, those which are controlled
by the design manager and those which are used to indicate
the status of the design, recording the configuration after
changes have been incorporated into the design. The ship
design manager should institute control procedures in those
areas where they will be most effective: space, manning,
and a controlled equipment list. Other areas, such as
weight, cost, master equipment lists, electrical power, and
combat system block diagrams, should be included in the area
of configuration status. This formal delineation between
27

control documentation and status documentation has not been
used in past designs, but some of the change control
documentation has fallen into the status category because
of the undesirability or impracticality of controlling
these design parameters. (60) A NAVSEC handbook, "Design
Configuration Control Requirements and Procedures"/ issued
in February 1975, describes in detail the two tier config-
uration control and recommends procedures for implementation
of configuration control procedures. (32)
About two-thirds of the way through preliminary design,
the ship design is frozen, so that a complete baseline may
be prepared. The remainder of preliminary design is used
to prepare a functional baseline and Top Level Requirements
for presentation to DSARC II. A refined cost goal can now
be determined, using the results of system and subsystem
tradeoff studies.
At the end of preliminary design, the functional base-
line is used to produce a Class C estimate. At this point
the majority of the engineering features of the ship have
been designed so that the potential for additional major
cost reduction is negligible without undertaking major
subsystem or equipment modifications.
Top level requirements are completed during preliminary
design and should be signed by the Chief of Naval Material
and the Chief of Naval Operations prior to presentation of
the program to DSARC II. The draft Top Level Specification
28

(TLS) is started at this time. The TLS, issued by the
NAVSHIPS Ship Acquisition Project Manager (SHAPM)
,
presents
the quantitative performance requirements for the ship.
Navy Ship Acquisition programs have not used the TLR/TLS
documents in the manner in which they were intended
(See Section V)
.
At the completion of Preliminary Design, the Navy must
return to a second DSARC to get permission to continue with
full-scale engineering development. For the ship design
this means initiation of contract design after cost
differences between CNO goal and the functional baseline
estimates are reconciled. Again there is little cost
visibility in contract design, except where major change
proposals are evaluated. Formal change control procedures
are used to minimize cost and weight growth. Since much of
the detailed engineering work is done in preliminary design,
contract design primarily consists of translating the
functional baseline into a set of contract specifications.
These specifications must define the ship to the level
of detail necessary for a prospective shipbuilder to be
able to bid for the construction contract for the ship.
The primary output of contract design is the Ship
Specification, contract drawings, and contract quidance
drawings. All design work carried out in previous phases
is validated and developed to a greater level of detail.
Reading sessions are used to review the ship specifications
29

to ensure their completeness and to avoid contradictions
within the contract documents. Very few changes to the
ship design should occur during contract design. At the
end of contract design, a Class A or B cost estimate is
produced with the allocated baseline. This cost estimate
becomes the cost ceiling for detail design and construction.
Contract design ends the Navy's direct participation
in the ship design. A contract is awarded to a lead ship-
yard to conduct detail design. The lead shipyard or its
design agent carries out the detail design under the con-
tractual arrangements enforced by the SHAPM. Detail design
is used to convert the Contract Design Package into working
drawings for ship construction and into procurement
specifications for Contractor Furnished Equipment and
Material. The control of the ship design in this stage
of the acquisition cycle is beyond the scope of this thesis.
2.2 The Patrol Frigate Design
Control of the Patrol Frigate design is presented in
three parts. First the requirements for a new ship were
determined, and a ship type, size, and mission were proposed
After confirming the feasibility of this ship design, con-
straints were levied by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
.
Then the ship design effort was conducted by the Naval Ship
Engineering Center (NAVSEC) . This discussion of the control
of the ship design is concentrated on the effort to control
ship size and cost in order to complete the ship design
within the desired constraints.
30

2.2.1 Determination of Requirements (15,62)
The United States' long-range military objectives are
set by the President with the assistance of his primary
advisors, Cabinet members, and the National Security Council
,
The Secretary of Defense and his staff translate national
objectives into the missions and tasks of the separate armed
services as set forth in the DPPG, Defense Policy and
Programming Guide. The Chief of Naval Operations, through
his staff, OPNAV, determines the force levels and force
mix required to carry out the missions assigned to the Navy.
In 1970 it was realized that there was a need for a
large number of escort ships to replace the World War Two
vintage destroyers which were in poor material condition
and contained obsolete equipment. The projected force
levels fell below the numbers that will be required in the
early 1980's.
Studies were conducted to determine the relationship
between the number of ships that could be built and the
collective force effectiveness for a fixed total cost of
non-carrier capable escort ships. (15) Hull sizes from
1500 tons to 7000 tons were selected, typical armaments
were determined for each hull size, and ship costs were
computed. The force of escort ships ranged from a few
very effective and very expensive ships which cannot pro-
tect enough areas to be a significant improvement in force
effectiveness, to many small inexpensive ships which do
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not carry enough armament to provide significantly increased
protection to the fleet.
Operating scenarios analyzed combat situations with
the new ships in company with a mixed force of existing
ships. A displacement force effectiveness plot was devel-
oped which showed a broad maximum effectiveness in the
3000/3500 ton range. (Figure 2.3) This size ship was
priced in the 45-50 million dollar range.
At this time the high-low concept of Naval force
mixture was being developed. The high mix ships are fully
capable ships which can operate with the offensive strike
forces. These high cost ships can only be purchased in
limited numbers and include the CVAN's, DLGN's (now CGN's)
and nuclear submarines. A large number of less capable,
relatively austere low-mix ships can then be built to
carry out the other missions of the Navy.
In September 1970, Admiral Zumwalt directed that
studies begin on a new escort in the 50 million dollar
price range, with a displacement of about 3200 tons. Initial
feasibility studies indicated that this was possible, and
conceptual design commenced in January 1971.
2.2.2 Conceptual Design (4 7)
Conceptual design consisted of tradeoff studies between
mission requirements and ship weapons and propulsion systems.
During this phase of the ship design process, the Office of
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RADM Frank Price, would not set definitive requirements.
RADM Price had frequent meetings with the SHAPM staff to
present "what-if" questions and to review the possible
alternatives derived manually and through the NAVSEC ship
synthesis model.
Two ship configurations were developed during concep-
tual design, one for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and one
for anti-air warfare (AAW) , since it was assumed that both
ship types were required to perform economically the
missions and tasks envisioned for the Patrol Escort. As
the studies proceeded, a common ship with two versions
differing only in combat systems evolved as the best
candidate design. Several hundred alternative ship con-
figurations were developed, including conversion or redesign
of DE1052 class and USCG Hamilton class ships. During
conceptual design, emphasis was placed on the selection of
weapons suits, and propulsion system.
At the completion of the conceptual studies, several
ship design alternatives were presented to the Chief of
Naval Operations. Admiral Zumwalt selected one set of ship
characteristics and directed that preliminary design start
on that ship, primarily an AAW ship with ASW capability.
The concept of a single hull design with two separate
combat system configurations was dropped at this time. It
was estimated that this ship would displace almost 3700 tons
and cost almost 50 million dollars. At this point Admiral




The design constraints were first imposed at the end
of conceptual design. Admiral Zumwalt wanted to ensure
that the PF did not experience the growth seen in other
weapons acquisition projects. A cost of $45-50 million
per ship was estimated at the end of conceptual design.
The CNO wanted to put as much "incentive" as possible into
maintaining the low cost of the follow ships, and therefore
he selected $45 million per follow ship as the cost
constraint.
The PF displacement constraint evolved from Admiral
Zumwalt 's experience with the growth of the DX (DD963) design,
beginning with his involvement in the conceptual studies of
the DX. When he returned to Washington as CNO following his
tour of duty in Vietnam, he was dismayed to find that the
displacement of the DD-963 had grown by about 1000 tons.
(NOTE: Exact design displacement of the DD-963 at any
point in time is difficult to determine because of the
numerous configurations of this ship design. The open
literature is very confusing on this point.) The displace-
ment constraint on the PF (and later on the DG-AEGIS) was
his method of ensuring that the same type of growth did
not happen to the new ships.
The manning constraint was imposed upon the PF design
as an afterthought. (57) A chart showing the projected
manning distribution was used to show the sensitivity of
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the ship's crew to proposed system options in a briefing
to Admiral Zumwalt. The purpose of this briefing was to
obtain a decision on cost reduction alternatives. Admiral
Zumwalt decided that a reduction in ship manning could be
made without significantly reducing ship capabilities, so
he told the SHAPM to reduce ship manpower requirements.
The CNO imposed a limit of 185 accommodations on the ship
design.
A manning reduction has the advantage of reducing
both acquisition cost and life cycle cost of the ship.
A reduction in accommodations reduces the space and weight
required for crew berthing, messing, and recreation, and
has the secondary effect of reducing the space and weight
of all crew-related ship systems, provisions, laundry,
personnel services, electric power, etc. Manpower costs
are estimated to consume 55% of the life cycle cost of a
ship, so any significant reduction in manning will also
reduce life cycle costs. (1)
Although a reduction in manpower reduces cost and
displacement directly, in some ways this reduction works
against the other constraints. A decrease in ship manning
requires automation of many ship functions; but automated
equipment costs money and usually carries a greater technical
risk than non-automated equipment. The lower reliability
of automated equipment and the decrease in maintenance
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personnel will result in a sacrifice in ship reliability
unless these factors are offset by an increased redundancy
in equipment, requiring additional cost and weight.
The setting of design constraints influences the
entire design process and therefore should be done in a
rational manner, based on a technical assessment of the
entire problem. The operating forces became very much
involved in technical decisions concerning the ship design.
RADM Price represented OPNAV in the design of the Patrol
Frigate to an extent never before seen in ship design. The
Navy's design branch (NAVSEC) no longer makes many of the
design decisions. In many cases their role is to surface
viable alternatives for consideration by the customer (OPNAV)
.
(55) Admiral Rickover has critically emphasized the
differentiation between the role of the line officer and
the technical specialist. He points out that "(The line
officer) has become deeply involved in making decisions on
technical matters for which his training has not qualified
him. Instead of deciding what he needs, he is now often
deciding how his needs shall be met. "(15)
The criticism in this thesis is not directed specifi-
cally at Admiral Price, as the author is not familiar with
the Admiral's technical qualifications, but at the precedent
that he is setting in the relationship between the




Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2, and 2.2.3 have shown how the
design constraints of cost, displacement, and manning
were developed. These requirements must then be imposed
on the ship design. This section discusses how cost and
ship configuration were controlled on the Patrol Frigate




Design-to-cost is a misnomer in the PF and
other ship designs. Costs are used as one design parameter
in system and subsystem tradeoff studies, but total ship
cost is only known at specific design freeze points. Cost
control is hampered by a lack of design detail in the early
stages of ship design. Many cost estimates are approxima-
tions based on system weights and educated guesses as to
the cost of equipment. The subsystem designers and
engineers have not developed the tools for design-to-cost.
The final design may be influenced by a desire to minimize
cost, weight, space, or manning, but this is not design-to-
cost.
A simple cost program, relying on "one-digit" weights,
was developed by NAVSEC for use in the PF Concept Explora-
tion to determine cost estimates for design alternatives.
During the FBL and PABL stages of ship design, cost
changes to a design baseline were used to evaluate design
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tradeoffs. Marginal cost factors were developed for pounds
of displacement, square feet of deck area, and required
manning. These factors were used to calculate cost deltas,
increases or decreases in follow ship costs. J.J. Sejd
describes the marginal cost concept in his article in the
Naval Engineer's Journal
. (18) Also, in certain instances,
cost estimates were used to evaluate systems.
A running total ship cost was not maintained during
the PF ship design. Cost decisions were made on the basis
of the cost deltas, and total follow ship costs were calcu-
lated only at certain design milestones. In addition,
30-40 percent of total ship costs were a function of the
Combat System, and not under the control of NAVSEC Ship
Design Manager.
Ship costs were considered as a design parameter and
known to be important, but were not used to monitor the
progress of the ship design or to control the ship design.
That function fell to the space and weight budgets and the
broad area of configuration control.
2.2.4.2 Configuration Control
The design budget is identified as a management
tool in the Patrol Escort Concept Exploration Report. (46)
The purpose of this budget is to give visibility and
accountability to ship subsystems. The budget identifies
the demands of subsystems on overall ship size and cost so
that the effect of subsystem design on the ship is known and
can be adjusted in subsystem tradeoffs.
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The quantities of weight, space, vertical center of
gravity, electrical power, cooling water, salt water, and
high pressure air were to be controlled through the design
budget. The budget concept as implemented in the PF was
too ambitious and unrealistic, and was not completely
successful. (37) The PF design budget was actually used to
control weight and usable deck space. The other design
factors were controlled by other means or not controlled
at all.
Electric power was not controlled because the
individual engineers were unable to determine power
requirements within the work breakdown structure. Sea water,
fresh water, and high pressure gases could not be controlled
to the level of detail necessary with the limited available
manpower.
Cost was not controlled by the design budget. Cost
factors are not known in fine enough detail to be factored
into the design early in design process. Total ship cost
estimates were computed at NAVSHIPS (now NAVSEA) , not by
the design team at NAVSEC. NAVSEC developed marginal cost
factors using the Ship Synthesis model (DD-07) , which were
used in making tradeoff decisions.
The use of a weight budget of 34 00 tons for the PF was
not totally effective as a method for controlling displace-
ment. (37) Prior to the PF design NAVSEC Code 6133, Weight
Branch, had handled all of the ship system weight accounting.
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System designers were not familiar with the weight break-
down structure, and many were not aware of the actual
weights of equipment they were installing. A lack of
familiarity with weights hurt the weight control efforts.
The original assignment of weights within the 3400 ton
budget was arbitrary, not based on a careful analysis of
weight distribution in previous ship designs. Consequently
some designers were assigned only 25-50% of the weight
necessary to complete any design, while others had a weight
surplus. Many designers who were unable to design a system
within the budget ignored the weight control system, while
many designers with excess weight hoarded their surplus.
Many engineers did not understand, nor did they properly
use the change request processes
.
(37)
A further problem in weight control was a failure to
look at the total ship impact of small changes in subsystem
design. Looking at each system by itself can distort the
decision-making process, usually in favor of changes in the
system, since it is easy to argue that a small change will
not affect the ship early in design.
Except for specific trade-off studies, such as 400 Hz
motor generators vs. static convertors, ship's service
power analysis, sources of auxiliary heat, etc., the Change
Control Board concentrated on the arrangement drawings for
control of the ship design.
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The ability to control the PF ship design adequately
was a function of the leadership provided by the project
management team in NAVSEC and of the Change Control Board.
Significant effort was expended to ensure that as many
reasonable alternatives as possible were examined for space
and weight savings. Standard design practices and design
margins were carefully examined, and those which could not
be backed by engineering analysis were reevaluated to
reduce total ship weight. This practice produced some
problems which resulted in the addition of a fourth diesel
generator, a fifth fire pump, and a longitudinal bulkhead
during the detail design phase. The area of design margins
is controversial and requires additional study.
In spite of the problems associated with the design
budgets, the PF design was more effectively controlled
than any previous NAVSEC design. (37) The design budget
is not, and was never meant to be, a design procedure.
It is an accounting system for engineering properties and
costs and was a useful method for maintaining the
visibility of crucial design parameters.
Prior to the configuration freeze in the later stages
of preliminary design, the change review process should be
relatively informal. Too much formality was used in the
PF preliminary design, and this made the control process
too unwieldy. (37) After the freeze of the preliminary
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design, a configuration control baseline (CCBL) was
established. The CCBL consisted of budgets (weight,
manning, etc. ) , master equipment lists (MEL) , and
arrangement drawings.
Formal change control procedures were adopted to
maintain control over the ship design. These procedures
were initiated within NAVSEC with the establishment of a
configuration control baseline. The baseline grew in scope
as decisions were made regarding subsystem tradeoffs until
completion of the functional baseline. The functional
baseline was used as the initiation point for the contract
design.
With the approval of the Lead Ship Allocated Baseline
(LSABL), the configuration control functions of NAVSEC
transferred to the PF Ship Acquisition Project Manager
(SHAPM) in the Naval Ship Systems Command. The role of
design agent shifted from the Navy (NAVSEC) to a private
contractor for the detail design. The SHAPM enforces
configuration control through contractural agreements with
the design agent.
2.3 Summary of Chapter 2 Conclusions
1. The Navy went through a systematic process of
evaluating future fleet requirements and projected




2. In the conceptual design phase, the Navy examined
a large number of ship alternatives and proposed the best
of these alternatives to the Chief of Naval Operations for
selection of a ship weapons system. Because OPNAV did not
select the complete combat system until after conceptual
design, conceptuate baseline cost estimate was only of
Class F "ballpark" quality.
3. Admiral Zumwalt selected cost and weight constraints
of approximately 10% below the conceptual baseline estimates
for a ship with the selected weapons system. As will be
shown in Chapter 3, the weight constraint was unreasonably
low. The values of these constraints were based more on
the feeling of what was possible than on sound engineering
analysis.
4. The manning constraint is another example of an
OPNAV decision made on an impulse, without knowing all of
the effects of this decision. The reduction in manning did
result in the ability to maintain a relatively small weight
and volume fraction devoted to personnel without a reduction
in the Navy's habitability standards. This reduction in
manning, however, required additional automated equipment
and the initiation of a new maintenance philosophy. The
planning for "maintenance by replacement" started in late
1974, and the true cost of this reduction in shipboard
maintenance is still unknown. Life cycle cost was sacrificed
for a lower acquisition cost and increased habitability, but
the full cost of that decision may not be known for years.
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5. The setting of design constraints influences the
entire ship design process and therefore should be done in
a rational manner, based on a technical assessment of the
design problem. The respective roles of the operator and
the ship design manager should be reviewed and clarified.
The operator should make decisions associated with the
performance requirements of a new ship and should make the
performance/cost tradeoff decisions. But the technical
decisions and technical aspects of the ship design must be
under the cognizance of technically trained personnel.
The technical management must ensure that the cost/
performance tradeoff decisions are made on a sound technical
basis.
6. Although the Patrol Frigate is advertised as a
design-to-cost ship, final ship cost was not directly
controlled as a design parameter. System and subsystem
cost tradeoffs were made on the basis of marginal cost
factors or cost deltas.
7. The NAVSEC design team used a complex budget
system to control the ship design. The designers and
engineers had not previously worked with a design budget,
and the effort was only partially successful.
8. The most significant element in the control of the
PF weight and cost was the existence of a strong Change
Control Board. This board emphasized low cost and low
weight in all phases of the ship design and was able to
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control the growth of the design. The most successful tools
for design control were the arrangement drawings and the
space budget.
9. The design process has undergone an evolutionary
change away from the very distinct phases of feasibility
study, conceptual design, preliminary design, and contract
design. Many feasibility studies are done during concept
design, and yet some of the concept design effort must be
done to a level of detail previously not accomplished until
preliminary design. Much of the design detail previously
left for contract design must now be done in preliminary
design in order to be able to make the necessary cost and
weight tradeoff decisions.
In spite of the problems noted above, the displacement
and cost of the Patrol Frigate were controlled throughout
the preliminary and contract design phases. Although the
Patrol Frigate was not designed within the CNO constraints,
the design team was able to control the growth of the





ANALYSIS OF THE PATROL FRIGATE DESIGN
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the Patrol
Frigate from the viewpoint of naval ship design. The effort
to keep weight below the given goal is examined, and the
decisions to keep the weight and cost of the PF low are
presented. The Patrol Frigate is compared with similar
U.S. Naval ships to determine how the PF is different from
other recent designs. The austerity decisions are
quantified to determine the effect of these decisions on
the PF design. Conclusions are drawn as to the effective-
ness of design-to-cost and the role of the designer and
the customer , the Chief of Naval Operations.
3.2 Weight History of the PF
Figure 3.1 shows the cyclical nature of the Patrol
Frigate estimated displacement. The PF design through the
end of contract design (LSABL) was a constant battle to
reach the displacement goal set by the Chief of Naval
Operations. (NOTE: The terminology used in the Patrol
Frigate design phase is compared with that of other designs
in Figure 2.1.) With the award of the lead ship design
contract, the Defense System Acquisition Review Council
(DSARC) threshold displacement of 3600 tons became the














































































threshold requires resubmission of the program to the
Secretary of Defense through the DSARC for permission to
continue the program.
As described in Chapter Two, the operations analysis
and feasibility studies recommended an optimum escort in
the 3000-3500 ton range (Point 2 in Figure 3.1). The
Chief of Naval Operations selected a target displacement of
3200 tons for the conceptual design of the Patrol Escort
(Point 3) . The resulting ship designs ranged from 2800 tons
to 3800 tons full load displacement, depending upon the
combination of weapon systems selected for the ship.
(Point 4)
The CNO selected a ship with both anti-submarine and
anti-air warfare capabilities. A single shaft propulsion
plant was selected along with the weapons systems. The
selected combination of weapon systems was estimated to
result in a ship design of 4 35 feet in length and a full
load displacement of 3675 tons (Point 5)
.
Several important decisions were made during conceptual
design to keep the displacement low. (Table 3.1) Departure
from past practice of buying only U.S. products for U.S.
Navy ships allowed the selection of a lightweight gun and
fire control system. Design and builders' margins were
reduced by 2%. The future change characteristics margin
was eliminated, and the service life margin was reduced to




AUSTERITY MEASURES FROM CONCEPTUAL DESIGN PHASE
1. Deletion of Future Change Characteristics Margin
2. Reduction in Service Life Margin
3. Decision to allow purchase of foreign designed weapon
systems resulting in the selection of:
a. the Oto Melara gun
b. the Dutch design fire control system
4. Cross utilization of personnel, decreasing manning
from 253 to 213 men
5. Reduction in design and builder's margins
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significant effort was made to reduce shipboard manning
through cross-utilization of personnel. The impact of
these decisions is summarized in Table A-2 . The impli-
cation of these decisions is discussed later in this
chapter.
These decisions were factored into the 3675 ton weight
estimate, but the CNO was not satisfied with the size of
the ship. He directed that 3400 tons be the "upper limit
of full load displacement". (28)
With the CNO constraint of 3400 tons, NAVSEC shortened
the PF to 400 feet and estimated a displacement of 3310 tons
in August 1971. By October 1971 the ship had grown to
3400 tons, and it became evident that the desired ship
characteristics could not be built into a 400 foot ship.
Ship length was increased to 420 feet, and displacement rose
above 3600 tons. At the completion of the functional
baseline design (December '71) estimated full load dis-
placement was 3672 tons, and estimated VCG was .88 feet
higher than that required to meet stability criteria. (44)
(Point 6 on Figure 3.1)
Immediately following completion of the functional
baseline (FBL) , the design documents were reviewed by the
shipbuilder (Bath Iron Works) , the alternate shipbuilder
(Todd), NAVSEC, NAVSHIPS, and others. It was determined
that the stability and weight problems could not be solved
within the present configuration. Ship length was reduced
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to 400 feet. The ship rearrangement resulted in "an
unidentified reduction of 100 tons and 2000 square feet
of deck area". (35) As a result of the shortened hull and
the implementation of some of the design review comments,
the PF started contract design at 3590 tons.
In May, 1972, the Chief of Naval Operations changed
the weapon systems requirements for the PF. The AN/SQS-23
(Pair) sonar was replaced by a lighter weight AN/SQS-505
sonar, and a requirement to carry a second LAMPS helicopter
was added.
The ship was lengthened by eight feet in order to
resolve below decks arrangements problems, but the full
load displacement was lowered to 3507 tons. It was this
configuration which was presented to the Defense Systems
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) in August, 1972. (Point 8)
Emphasis on weight control brought a lowering of the
weight to 3490 tons before the increased design detail
resulted in revision of estimated weight upward. By October,
1972, estimated weight had risen to 3580 tons, and a weight
and stability improvement program was initiated. This
program took a detailed look at all aspects of the Patrol
Frigate design. The largest savings resulted from the
deletion of the emergency diesel generator, deletion of
main engine silencers and acoustic treatment, and replace-
ment of the auxiliary steam system with a waste heat
recovery system for auxiliary heating requirements. The
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0-2 level was removed primarily to improve ship stability.
Very little weight savings resulted from this rearrangement
of spaces as no equipment or functions on the 0-2 level
were deleted. Many small measures were used to reduce
weight including the removal of extra furniture from the
Executive Officer's stateroom at a savings of 0.25 tons.
It is estimated that this weight reduction program decreased
displacement by over 100 tons, but growth in other areas
resulted in a preliminary allocated baseline (PABL) weight
estimate of 3540 tons full load displacement. (35 ,44)
Tables 3-2 through 3-6 list most of the austerity
items initiated on the Patrol Frigate during the FBL and
PABL phases of ship design. These lists were developed
from the records of the NAVSEC Configuration Control Board,
a rough draft of the Technical History of NAVSEC PF Design
Project, and personal contact with personnel involved in
the PF design. The impact of these decisions is discussed
in greater detail later in this chapter.
A NAVSEC Adjudication Board (NAB) supervised a new
weight reduction program and reviewed comments on the PABL
design in early 1973. The efforts of the board resulted in
a further reduction to the Lead Ship Allocated Baseline
displacement of 3480 tons, (in April 1973, Point 10) This






7. Single ship's boat
8. Removal of 2nd anchor,
chain and windlass




11. Replace 600 HP aux.
propulsion motor with
2 325 HP motors
12. Remove milling machine-
13. Replacement of aux.
boiler with waste
heat system
14. Remove oil and water
test lab
15. Delete main engine
silencers and
acoustic treatment
all of the workshops have been
combined into one space
most ships of this size carry
one 26 f motor whale boat (MWB)
and one 26' personnel boat.
The PF has one 26' MWB.
normal practice is to carry two
anchors, with windlass and
chain for each. Initially
the windlass and chain were
removed, leaving the second
anchor as a spare. Later
the second anchor was deleted.
AFFF (fire fighting) station size
was decreased from 4 square
feet to 25 square feet each
smaller size (4 cfh vice 20 cfh)
was selected for low weight
and cost at the risk of some
development
savings in cost, weight and
space by using existing
submarine equipment
waste heat system is run from
diesel generator
system. Primary savings in
boiler weight and lower
endurance fuel.
not required after removal of
waste heat system
allows modification of intake










18. Remove two fire pumps -
19. Deletion of cruise
engine
20. Deletion of roll
stabilization




for 25 0KW generator





25. Inclusion of helo




standard Navy practice would
dictate four coils, only three
are installed on PF
required by TLR and Gen Specs -
removed by SHAPM
re-evaluation of fire main
requirements based on latest
available information. One
pump was reinstalled during
detail design.
decision made early in FBL
because of marginal improve-
ment in capabilities
space only provided in PABL;
weight reservation added
during detail design
30% growth margins applied to
limited areas resulted in





to protect against loss of
both machinery spaces from
the same casualty. Emergency
load requirements were reduced
to permit smaller generator.
results in significant reduction
in shafting weight
- missile resupply by VERTREP
only





26. No dial telephone - normally installed on DE size
system ships
27. No provision for
pneumatic tubes for
interior communications
28. Less severe noise - will result in lower cost but
requirements than not necessarily lower weight
recent ship designs
29. No STOPS treatment










34. No secondary conn
or lookout stations
35. Deletion of RPS
custodian's office
36. Deletion of monorail
hoist in hanger
replacement of AN/SQS-23 (PAIR)
sonar with AN/SQS-505 sonar,
addition of second helicopter
sonar system did not meet time-
table for production with PF.
Space but no weight reserva-
tion for future addition.
equipment normally housed on




5-ton hoist and monorail system





HULL STRUCTURE AUSTERITY ITEMS
37. Remove ECM equipment


















- equipment installed on 0-1
level - improved stability
43. Reduced Structural
margins
44. Extensive use of GRP
45. Removal of unnecessary
watertight hatches
46. Reduce helicopter plat-
form structural design
criteria
47. No external inclined
ladders
installed on most DE ships to
protect personnel against green
water (waves) . Believed
unnecessary with PF hull design
tanks arranged to make better
use of structural bulkheads
- originally installed to reduce
vibration from screw, removed
as unnecessary in PABL,
reinstalled during detail
design
- 1.0 tons per square inch primary
stress margin for future dis-
placement growth reduced to
.75 tsi since little future
displacement growth is planned







49. Reject increase in
medical spaces
50. Combined galley












- dictated by CNO
- reduction in space of proposed
medical treatment room with-
out reducing capability
- substitution of officer's
pantry for galley - similar to
submarine arrangement
- executive officer's stateroom
is designed for two men,
furniture for second officer
was removed
- eliminates need for Battle
Dressing Station
combined with other supply
spaces
unmanned engine room allows
reduced manning
transfer maintenance functions














60. Definition of cost
ceiling
- extended the time between first
and second ships to allow for
verification of design before
followship contract
- larger ship contracts to take
advantage of economics of
scale
- selection of low risk equipment
- systems and equipment validation
through extensive test and
evaluation program
- use of standarized equipment
within the class and within
the Navy including use of
options on some subsystem
procurements
- excluding shipbuilder acquisition
costs
- excluding outfitting and post
delivery requirements
- constant dollars




The detail design of the Patrol Frigate is being done
by the Naval Architectural firm of Gibbs and Cox. The first
detail design weight report in July, 1973, estimated the
Patrol Frigate as greater than 3600 tons full load dis-
placement. The Navy and Gibbs and Cox reviewed this weight
report line item by line item and reached an agreement on
an estimated weight of 3560 tons. The Navy directed Gibbs
and Cox to reduce the Design and Builders Margin by another
30 tons to reach full load displacement of 3530 tons in
March 1974. (61) The subject of margins is discussed more
fully later in this section.
During the detail design three major decisions were
made which have increased the PF displacement to 3585 tons
(Point 11) . A fourth diesel generator was added to the PF
electric plant at a total cost of 50 tons displacement and
the after longitudinal bulkhead removed during PABL was
designed back into the PF. The fin stabilizers were
changed from a space reservation only to a space and weight
reservation. The 75 ton service life margin was reduced to
50 tons to compensate for the weight of the fin stabilizers.
These decisions are discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.
The detail design has proceeded without increasing above
3585 tons from September, 1974, through March, 1975.
Figure 3.2 shows a comparison between the light ship
weight of three ships at various stages in the design




















Figure 3.2. Light Ship Displacement Growth During Design
Normalized
Light Ship = ( Displacement
Displacement Preliminary Design Displacement'
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Care must be taken when comparing the weights of ships
because the design phases may not be compatible. Since
the conceptual design phase of the PF approximates the
level of detail previously accomplished in the preliminary
design phase, the PF weight is normalized to the conceptual
design weight, prior to the imposition of constraints.
While the DEG-1 and DLGN-35 increased in light ship weight
during the design, the Patrol Frigate has decreased. Most
of the increases in the DEG-1 and DLGN-38 weight, however,
came during the contract design phase, while the increase
in PF weight is occurring during detail design. It should
be noted that the PF final weight is from the latest
available weight report (March, 1975) while the DEG-1 and
DLGN-35 weights are from inclining experiments. The PF
may grow larger if she uses the rest of the assigned design
and builder's margin. The area of design growth deserves
additional study.
In several areas the PF design differs from past naval
ship designs. Section 3.3 compares the PF with similar
U.S. ships.
3.3 The Patrol Frigate Compared With Similar U.S. Naval Ships
The purpose of this section is to compare the Patrol
Frigate with similar U.S. naval ships to determine where
this ship differs from other designs. These differences
are then compared with the austerity measures listed in
Section 3.2 to evaluate the effect of design-to-cost.
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The PF is compared with six other post-World War Two
destroyer designs, the DE-1037, DE-1040, DE-1052, DEG-1,
DDG-2, and DD-931. The "as-built" condition is used for
comparison because of the availability of weight and
volume information and to provide a consistent data base.
The characteristics of these ships are shown in Table 3.7.
Figures 3.3 through 3.11 present this comparison. The PF
is highlighted by a double symbol on these graphs.
Figure 3.3 shows the trend of increasing displacement
of destroyer escort size ships over the past twenty years.
This increase in size has been caused primarily by a desire
for increased ship performance (greater payload carrying
capability/ speed, habitability , etc.). The Patrol Frigate
reversed this trend of ever-increasing ship size. A
similar graph of destroyer displacement versus time would
show that the design-to-cost DG-AEGIS also reverses the
trend of increasing ship displacements.
Figure 3.4 shows the division of full load displacement
into categories describing the use of that weight as
structure, engineering, payload, and personnel. Table 3.8
shows the division of space and weight into these categories
and indicates the relationship with the Ship's Work Break-
down Structure for categorizing weights and the proposed
NAVSEC space classification guide for space allocation. The
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Note 1: All information is from Jane's Fighting Ships and
NAVSHIPS Publication "Building Escort Ships and Patrol
Frigates for the United States Navy". Ships are listed as
"as-built" condition except for PF which is as designed in
the PABL.
Note 2: None "as-built", Sea Sparrow missile system and
1 LAMPS helo were added in modernization, but not included
in analysis.






































NOTES: 1) All weights except PF are based on as-built
condition.
2) PF based on Contract Design- [Preliminary Allocated
Baseline - PABL]
.
3) Weight groups are from ship weight breakdown structure.






















Figure 3.3. Displacement vs. Year Commissioned for Post
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Figure 3.9. Payload Density for Destroyers and Frigates (DE)
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Figure 3.11. Power Plant Densities for Single Shaft Escorts











in the percent of weight devoted to structure, but this
class does show a high percent of weight used by personnel
and a low percent used in the payload.
Figure 3.5 shows the use of ship's volume by function.
The Patrol Frigate devotes less space to personnel and less
space to payload than comparable ship designs, the DDG-2,
DEG-1 and DE-1052 class ships. The PF, however, has a very
large area devoted to passageways and access. Some of this
passageway can be considered personnel volume as the reduced
manning and maintenance by replacement philosophy resulted
in the need for better access to equipment.
Figure 3.6 shows that the internal density of small
U.S. destroyers (2500-4500 tons) has remained constant,
regardless of ship size or payload until the design of the
PF. Internal ship density is measured as full load dis-
placement divided by total enclosed volume in pounds per
cubic foot. This graph shows that the PF is significantly
less dense than other similar size ships.
Figure 3.7 shows a trend of decreasing the percent of
weight devoted to engineering and payload with an increase
in the percent of weight devoted to structure. To under-
stand this graph and Figure 3.6, one must examine the




Figure 3.8 shows a trend of decreasing structural
density (group 1 weight/enclosed volume) with increasing
ship displacement and increasing total enclosed volume.
The PF and the all-gun DD-931 have a significantly lower
structural density than that shown by the trend line;
however, in the relationship between structural density and
total enclosed volume, the PF structural density is
consistent with previous ship designs.
Figure 3.9 shows payload density decreasing with time.
The trend of this curve is caused by the shift from the
gun as the primary weapon to lightweight, large volume
missile systems and helicopters. The PF accentuates this
trend with the shift to lightweight foreign weapon systems.
(See Section 3.4.5)
Figure 3.10 shows the effect of increased emphasis on
habitability on both weight and volume. The PF was able to
meet the latest habitability standards without devoting
an inordinate amount of space and weight to personnel
through a new maintenance and operating philosophy which
decreased required shipboard manning. (See Section 3.4.2)
Figure 3.11 shows a decreasing specific engineering
plant density (in pounds per horsepower) with increasing
shaft horsepower. A similar graph would show a decreasing
density with time. A closer look at the engineering plants,
however, shows that this decrease is due to advancing
technology, a 600 psi steam plant, followed by a 1200 psi
steam plant, followed by a gas turbine power plant.
78

Several general conclusions can be drawn from a
comparison of the Patrol Frigate with other U.S. Navy ships.
The PF has approximately the same internal volume,
but a displacement of 500 tons less than the DE-1052 class
escort. (Table 3.15) This implies that the two ships are
the same size, but the PF has more volume above water.
This was accomplished through a shift to less dense compon-
ents (weapons, propulsion, and personnel) than previous
ship designs. The wider passageways and the tanks for
control of environmental pollution also decrease the internal
density of the PF. The low density of the PF is shown very
clearly in Figure 3.3.
Allocation of weight by function is very similar to
the DEG-1 class escort, with the exception of a lower pay-
load weight. The lower paylcad weight of the PF is a
result of the use of a lightweight gun and a smaller sonar
on the PF.
Payload density (payload weight/payload volume) and
specific machinery weight (engineering weight/total power)
have both decreased, primarily as a result of technological
advances. Space and weight per man devoted to personnel
have increased with increasing standards of habitability,
but the percent of the ship, both in space and weight,
devoted to personnel has not changed appreciably because
of the emphasis on reduced manning. There have been no
79

significant savings from hull structural innovations on the
PF. It is unlikely that there can be any changes in ship
structural weight densities without resorting to expensive
lightweight materials.
3.4 The Effect of the Design-to-Cost Concept on the PF
Design
3.4.1 Introduction
In this section an attempt is made to quantify the
results of design-to-cost, to answer the question, "What
would the displacement of the Patrol Frigate have been
without the strong emphasis on weight control executed
throughout the ship's design?". The result is summarized
in Table 3.9 and interpreted in Section 3.4.8.
The effect of design-to-cost is calculated by
assigning a numerical value of weight, volume, or space to
the austerity items listed in Tables 3.1 through 3.5,
wherever possible. The analysis of the austerity items
was developed from the records of the NAVSEC Configuration
Control Board, a rough draft of the Technical History of
the NAVSEC PF Design Project, and personal contact with
personnel involved with the PF design. These resources
are not consistent in the evaluation of the effect of
these austerity items. Some of the effects are recorded
as deck area, some as internal volume, some as weight,
and some as a combination of the three effects. Secondary




CALCULATED EFFECT OF DESIGN-TO-COST
Conceptual Design (Table A-2) 343.8
FBL/PABL Engineering (A-3) 294.5
FBL/PABL Payload (A-4) 115.4
FBL/PABL Hull (A-5) 31
FBL/PABL Personnel (A-6) 104.4
Endurance Fuel 130
Total Effect +1019.1




Effect of Second Shaft + 400
Twin Shaft PF without design-
to-cost emphasis 4959.
Effect of Inverse Design-to-Cost
Under NAVSEC Control - 4 3.5
Not under NAVSEC Control - 170.9
Total Effect - 214.4
PABL Displacement 3540.
Possible PF displacement 3326
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were rarely considered (at least not in the records of the
Change Control Board) . Tables A-2 through A-7 represent the
author's best judgment as to the effect of each change,
based on the available sources.
The total effect of these decisions as summarized in
Table 3.9 is probably conservative because the secondary
effects such as auxiliary systems requirements and
electrical power are not included in many cases. In
addition, there were probably other growth areas which
were not proposed to the Change Control Board because the
philosophy of an austere ship was emphasized by the ship
design manager. Most of the weight savings, however, is
concentrated in a few major decisions, and it is not likely
that other growth areas would accumulate a large addition
to the estimated numbers.
The tables in Appendix A are divided into seven
categories—conceptual design phase, engineering, payload,
hull structure, personnel, acquisition, and unquantifiable.
The unquantifiable decisions (Table A-9) are those for
which the author could not substantiate a quantitative
estimate of the effect on full load displacement. Most of
the items on this list represent minor weight reduction,
so that the cumulative effect of the omission of these
sixteen austerity decisions will not significantly effect
the conclusions drawn from this analysis. The acquisition
policy decisions (Table A-8) include those decisions which
82

contribute to reduced follow ship acquisition cost, but are
not easy to quantify. Most of these decisions are based on
sound management practices, not necessarily a result of
design-to-cost/ and would be included in a large ship
procurement project regardless of cost policies. Acquisition
policy is discussed in greater detail by Newcomb and
DiTrapani. (12,13)
The conceptual austerity design decisions (Table A-2)
were discussed earlier in this chapter. The design decisions
made during preliminary and contract design are divided into
the same four weight categories used in Section 3.2 and 3.3.
A review of these tables with the graphs in Section 3.3
shows that a majority of the weight savings was accomplished
in four major areas:
1. Reduction in margins and the elimination of
future characteristics change margins.
2. Reduction in shipboard manning and retention
of high standards of habitability.
3. Propulsion plant selection.
4. Payload selection.
These areas are discussed in Sections 3.4.2 through
3.4.5. Section 3.4.6 discusses inverse design-to-cost.
Inverse design-to-cost decisions are those decisions that
will cause the ship to increase in size. These decisions
generally run contrary to the austere philosophy of the PF
design. Section 3.4.7 discusses the limitations of this




3.4.2 Use of Margins on the Patrol Frigate Design
One of the areas most susceptible to criticism in the
patrol Frigate design is the adjustment of margins from
previous design practices. Margins were examined in every
area of ship design and were reduced from previous design
practices in many areas, including design margins, service
life margins, structural margins, electrical power growth
margins, and future growth margins.
A margin is defined as "an allowance for weight at a
specific location in a ship, made in a weight estimate by
the naval architect to cover the inherent lack of precision
in initial weight estimates and the unknown additions that
will take place in the life of the ship". (23) Margins are
similarly applied to other design quantities, such as space,
power, and manning. (2)
The margin should reflect the degree of confidence in
the weight estimates, the firmness of the design, and
anticipated contingencies. A policy of minimum growth
margins was established for the Patrol Frigate during
conceptual design. This policy resulted from OPNAV guidance
to maintain discipline on those factors which contribute to
ship growth. (47) Table 3.10 shows the normal margins for
a combatant ship and the margins selected for the Patrol




1) the PF was defined at the end of conceptual
design to the degree of detail not previously seen before
the end of preliminary design, and therefore fewer design
uncertainties existed and a careful control of the design
could minimize growth.
2) the Chief of Naval Operations eliminated
the future characteristics change margin, implying that any
new combat system would not increase the weight of the ship,
Therefore, there was little need to make allowances for
growth after the ship was built. This philosophy carried
over into the evaluation of electrical and structural
growth margins.
The imposition of constraints by the Chief of Naval
Operations should have led to a re-evaluation of the design
and builder's margins. The design was no longer firm, and
there was no longer a high degree of confidence in the
weight estimates. The uncertainties of designing in a new
environment should have led to a restoration of the normal
preliminary and ship system design margin.
The accommodations margin was reduced from 10% to 5%.
This reduction can be justified by the depth of the manning
study that was conducted during conceptual design. With
the imposition of an absolute limit of 185 accommodations
in the PF, the number of accommodations became fixed and




COMPARISON OF PATROL FRIGATE AND NORMAL MARGINS (47)
MARGIN






NORMAL PF BASED ON
1.5% Light ship
4% 4% Light ship*
1% 1% Light ship*
1.25% 1% Light ship






5% 75 tons Full load
(22%)
.5 ft. .25 ft.
100 tons none
10% 5%
*Light ship minus 600 tons fixed weights for PF.
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Future characteristics change margin is controlled by
the Chief of Naval Operations and is used for specific ship
improvements and modernization. The service life margin
allows for "creeping growth and updating of the ship
throughout its active life. The service life margin is
used to update and improve ship systems, structures,
equipment, and accommodations"
.
(23) At the end of concep-
tual design, the service life margin was selected as 75
tons, 95 tons below the normal 5% margin for a ship of
this type. In detail design 25 tons of the service life
margin was allocated to the ship's fin stabilizer systems.
One-third of the limited service life margin had been used
before the PF keel was laid for a change which should have
been charged to future characteristics change.
The reduction in service life margin and the elimi-
nation of a margin for future characteristics changes run
contrary to the lessons of past ship designs. Extensive
weapons system modernization of the DE-1052 class was
started before the last ship in the class was delivered
to the fleet. The DD-963 class has significant space and
weight reserved for future growth and modernization.
Leopold points out the distinction between platform life
and weapon system life. The life span of a ship hull is
approximately 25 years, while the life span of a weapon
system is approximately 7-10 years. Past destroyer-type
ships have changed payloads two or three times. (8) In this




Structural stress margins were reduced because "little
future displacement growth is planned" . (42) Normally the
calculated primary stress is limited to 1.0 tsi (ton per
square inch) less than the design primary stress to account
for increased stresses due to future displacement growth.
The intended stress margin in the PF was to be 0.75 tsi;
however, the actual stress margin slipped to 0.50 tsi late
in the design due to changes in the ship's weight distri-
bution. (47)
Electrical growth margins were imposed in a manner
different from previous designs. The applicable Bureau of
Ships Ship Design Division Technical Practices Manual
criteria for determining the number and kilowatt rating of
ship service generators are:
1) A minimum of three generators.
2) In the event of derangement of one ship
service generator, the remaining ship service generators
will carry the functional load (defined as major ship
operating load)
.
3) A future load growth margin of 30-40% shall
be applied to the functional loads of surface combatant
ships other than aircraft carriers. (22)
The Technical Practices Manual also states that no
emergency generators are required on ships with diesel
driven ship service generators.
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The required growth margin was only selectively
applied to the Patrol Frigate in power categories 500, 600,
and 900: Interior Communications, Control, and Ship
Electronics, Ordnance Systems, and 400 Hertz systems.
The controlling load is the cruise load at 1927 KW without
growth. With the limited growth margins added, the cruise
load is 2035 KW. (38)
Four 750 KW diesel generators were originally
recommended for the PF electric plant. The electric power
plant was changed to three 1000 KW generators to save
weight, space, and cost. With three 1000 KW diesel
generators the PF could not supply functional load with one
ship service generator out of commission after an electrical
power growth of less than four percent.
Criterion (2) above was met when the 250 KW emergency
diesel was included in the design, but this generator was
removed during the weight and stability improvement program
late in contract design. A comparison of the PF growth
margin with that of other ships is shown in Table 3-11.
The problem of inadequate electrical growth margins
was settled with the addition of a fourth ship service
diesel generator during detail design.
The detail design and builders margin was not applied
to total light ship displacement as in previous designs.
600 tons was considered fixed and not likely to grow during




POWER GENERATION CAPABILITIES AND MARGINS (10)
SHIP SHIP EACH FUNCTIONAL NUMBER
SERVICE GENERATOR LOAD KW GENERATOR
GENERATORS RATING KW FOR CRUISE
INSTALLED LOAD
DE-1040 4 500 956 2
DEG-1 4 500 931 2
DE-1052 4 750 1172 2
DDG-FY67 4 1500 2402 2
PF-109 3* 1000 1927 2
























subject to a growth margin. While this may be a reasonable
assumption, it is a departure from past practice and the
percentage value of the margins should be adjusted
accordingly.
In summary, the margins on the PF were reduced in all
areas where these reductions could be justified. This
effect is difficult to quantify, but is estimated where
possible in Tables A-l through A-7. The total estimated
effect is approximately 24 tons, of which 50 tons includes
the fourth diesel generator which was added in the detail
design. The total effect of the reduced design and builders'
margins will be shown after the PF is completed by a
comparison of the estimated contract design weight with
the displacement as of the inclining experiment. The
reduction in service life and future characteristics
change margins will be shown by ship growth after commission-
ing and by the ability to modernize the Patrol Frigate
later in the ship's lifetime. The Patrol Frigate experience
with the electrical growth margins (ship service generator
selection) and with the future growth margins (ship
stabilizers) indicate that the assumptions made in reducing




3.4.3 Impact of Personnel on the PF Design
In recent years the problems of personnel retention
and the all-volunteer Navy have brought increased emphasis
on habitability and working conditions in naval ship designs,
The design of the Patrol Frigate is no exception. Although
the PF is austere in many areas, the ship is very comfor-
table for the men who man her.
In order to reach the desired standard of habitability
without severely impacting on the ship's major military
characteristics, a program of reduced manning was instituted
Reduced manning started in the conceptual design phase with
an emphasis on the cross-utilization of personnel; that is,
having men work outside of their area of specialty. This
philosophy reduced the required complement from 253 men to
213 men, a 16% reduction. (47) The second step in manpower
reduction came with the imposition of an accommodations
constraint by the Chief of Naval Operations as discussed
in Chapter 2.3. The reduction in accommodations to 185
men resulted in another 13% reduction in manning.
The attention to manning has resulted in several new
and unique features that contributed to the complexity of
the Patrol Frigate arrangement design. A discussion of
these features follows. (39)
The crew living spaces are grouped together in several
large complexes rather than numerous small spaces. This
arrangement improves the utilization of space and reduces
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the requirements for supporting distributive systems such
as accesses, air-conditioning and ventilation, . and communi-
cations sy terns.
The four-element living concept was introduced with
the Patrol Frigate. Separate areas are provided for
berthing, dressing, sanitation, and recreation/lounge
facilities.
The central galley complex coupled with a provisions
and ammunition elevator and dumb-waiter dictated that the
wardroom, crew's mess, CPO mess, scullery, and provisions
storerooms be arranged adjacent to (either horizontally
or vertically) the galley. The overall location of those
mess-related spaces was governed by the location of the
elevator.
A central office complex was designed to improve
personnel utilization and to obtain economies in facilities,
total space, and departmental coordination. This concept
affected the internal arrangements in that one large office
area was required as opposed to many small offices scattered
throughout the ship. The central office complex is somewhat
less than austere, as it consumes approximately the same
space as dispersed offices utilized for the same functions,
and it includes a junior officers' work area and a confer-
ence room. (35) The conference room and junior officers'
work area were added to provide additional work and meeting
areas outside the wardroom living area. This luxury seems
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excessive in view of the large space allocated to the
wardroom area and the austere nature of the Patrol Frigate
design.
Passageways are provided throughout the ship so that
personnel traffic avoids berthing areas and other functional
areas. In keeping with the concept of maintenance by
replacement, passageways and accesses have been provided to
remove major equipment for shore-based maintenance. The
effect of the large passageways on the area available for
other ship functions can be seen in Figure 3.5.
In Appendix A, it is shown that each man required an
average of 3.28 tons of outfit, furnishings, and personnel
related load and an average of 604 cubic feet of personnel
related space on the Patrol Frigate. The per man contribu-
tion to space and weight on the PF is almost as great as
that on the DD-963, a ship with over twice the displacement
of the PF. (Figure 3.8) It is obvious that the habitability
features on the PF escaped from the requirements to minimize
cost and weight.
3.3.4 Propulsion Plant Selection
As shown in Section 3.3, the propulsion plant density
(Group two weight per SHP) is lower in the PF than for other
U.S. single shaft destroyers. Gas turbine propulsion was
selected because of weight and volume advantages over steam
and diesel propulsion. These same advantages would probably
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have resulted in the selection of a gas turbine propulsion
plant even if the PF were not an austere ship. The
propulsion plant selected by the Chief of Naval Operations
at the end of concept exploration included a cruise turbine,
but this turbine was deleted from the ship design early in
preliminary design because its advantages were small
compared to the space and weight required.
Four hundred tons were saved through the selection of
a single screw power plant. From a vulnerability stand-
point, a twin screw power plant has little distinct
advantage over the single screw plant in a small ship where
separate propulsion spaces are not privided for each shaft.
(47) For the given speed requirements, it is apparent that
a single screw plant would probably have been selected
even if the PF had not been an austere design.
The selection of a single shaft gas turbine propulsion
plant influenced other decisions, including the requirement
for "take-home" capability (auxiliary propulsion system)
,
and the need for a source of auxiliary heat (auxiliary
boiler or waste heat system)
.
The major decisions of gas turbine prime mover and
single shaft propulsion are not included in the calculation
of the effect of design-to-cost because it is not clear that
these decisions would have been different if design-to-cost
did not exist. Other engineering plant decisions made in
the effort to meet the design goals are included.
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3.4.5 Effect of Payload on Design-to-Cost
The decision made during conceptual design to depart
from the practice of buying only systems of U.S. design
allowed the selection of lightweight weapons systems.
Approximately 18 tons in direct weight were saved by the
selection of the Italian Oto Melara 76MM gun instead of the
closest U.S. alternative, the 5"/54 lightweight gun, and
the Dutch Mk 87 gun fire control system instead of the
heavier Mk 86 system.
The single decision which resulted in the largest
decrease in displacement during FBL and PABL was the May
1972 decision to change the ship's characteristics. The
AN/SQS-23 (PAIR) sonar was replaced by a lightweight
AN/SQS-505 type sonar and a second LAMPS helicopter was
added. Deletion of the weight reservation for the TACTLASS
sonar resulted in another large weight savings.
A large portion of the weight and cost savings resulted
from the transfer of combat system functions to the LAMPS
helicopter. This step results in a decrease in follow ship
acquisition cost, because the cost of the helicopter is not
considered part of the follow ship cost. The helicopter is
purchased as part of the Navy budget, however, so the cost
to the Navy should be considered.
Most of payload cost is not under the control of the
ship design team at the Naval Ship Engineering Center.
Although NAVSEC is charged with keeping cost and weight
96

below a stated goal, combat systems items amounting to
30-40% of ship costs are beyond the control of NAVSEC. (34)
3.4.6 Inverse Design-to-Cost
Inverse design-to-cost refers to decisions which
caused the ship to increase in displacement and therefore
ran contrary to the austere philosophy of the PF design.
Table 3.12 lists inverse design-to-cost decisions under
NAVSEC control. The total effect on the ship design is
small, and the primary contributor is the increased size of
the passageways. The wide passageways resulted from a
tradeoff between volume and accessibility/removability of
equipment associated with a cost saving maintenance program,
(58,59) The wide passageways can be considered as a cost
of reduced manning, which generated the maintenance by
replacement philosophy.
Two decisions which were not under the control of
NAVSEC contributed to an increase in space and weight of
the Patrol Frigate. The habitability standards were not
reduced. The direct space and weight effect of reducing
habitability standards to the levels of the DE-1052 class
for a 185 man crew could be a savings of 87 tons displace-
ment.
Pollution control standards resulted in a large
increase in tankage because of the requirement to have a
clean ballast system and a sewage system. These large






61. Enlarge office complex
62. Athletic gear storeroom
63. Passageway access design
64. Ability to ballast with
fuel tanks




to provide for junior officer
work area and conference
room
to allow maintenance by
replacement and ease of
underway replenishment








- standards of living
approved by OPNAV
- incinerator and sewage
system
69. Oily waste holding tank
70. Clean ballast system
71. Close in weapons system - change in payload




discussed briefly in Section 3.2. The requirement for
including environmental protection systems in naval ships
is implied in Executive Order 11507 of 4 February 1971 and
Public Law 91-224. Although the adherence to environmental
pollution requirements causes an increase in the space and
weight devoted to non-mission oriented systems, higher
directives leave no choice for the ship designer.
With the exception of the space and weight caused by
the increase in habitability and environmental protection
systems, very few other design decisions were made which
increased the space and weight of the Patrol Frigate.
3.4.7 Limitations of the Analysis
The analysis presented here is limited by the quality
of the data and the desire to draw a quantitative conclusion
from many qualitative as well as quantitative decisions.
Many of the decisions presented as austerity items can also
be justified from other criteria, performance, effectiveness,
or sound engineering judgement. However, throughout the
design of the Patrol Frigate low cost and low weight were
given a very high priority in tradeoff analyses.
The recorded change requests reflect only part of the
savings in cost and weight attributed to design-to-cost
as they only indicate areas in which the Change Control
Board actually reviewed design options. Other areas of
growth were potentially present but not proposed because
of a knowledge of the PF design philosophy.
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The second order effects of increased displacement
are discussed in a very limited manner. An increase in
ship size requires a larger endurance fuel load, more
electrical power, and more auxiliary services, further
compounding the increase in displacement. Appendix A
shows a sample calculation of the increase in endurance
fuel required for main propulsion. While the absolute
numbers do not accurately reflect the Patrol Frigate, the
marginal cost, or fuel ratio, does give a reasonable
approximation of one of the secondary effects of the
increased displacement. It can be assumed that the
increase in propulsive power required to maintain design
speed in the enlarged PF can be kept small through an
adjustment of the speed/length ratio (V/»/L) .
Table 3.13 shows the design ratios used in the calcula-
tion of the effect of design-to-cost. These ratios were
derived from the PF/PABL weight statement and from the PF
Contract Plan Booklet. These ratios are lower than some of
the thumb rules developed from other naval ship designs.
For example, C. Graham estimates that the personnel weight
ratio is about five tons per man. (10) The DG-AEGIS
feasibility studies show a range of 3.9 to 6.5 tons per man
personnel weight ratio. The combined space and weight
ratio used in this paper equates to about three tons per
man. Graham's estimates include more second order effects
than the ratios used in this paper. The more conservative
















































It is assumed that the errors in assignment of design-
to-cost influence on design decisions are offset by the
conservative method of calculating design-to-cost effects.
The influence of the austere philosophy on the tradeoffs
proposed to the Change Control Board should be emphasized.
However, there is no means to quantify this influence.
This analysis has concentrated its efforts on displace-
ment because weight is an easily calculated quantity.
However, the reason for the design-to-cost philosophy is to
decrease the cost of ships to the Navy. Within limits low
weight equates to low cost. Ship cost estimating programs
use the ship work breakdown structure weights to calculate
part of the cost of a ship. Many ship costs cannot be
accurately estimated any other way. However, on a ship
design where both weight and cost are both highly con-
strained, guidance must be given as to which one should be
the controlling parameter. In the PF design cost was the
controlling factor. Tradeoff studies were conducted to
select the steel to be used in the hull structure. The
use of high tensile steel decreases the displacement, but
increases the cost of the ship. Mild steel was selected
for PF hull structure because of the lower cost. (54)
It is reasonable to discuss design-to-cost in terms of
displacement, but the naval architect and ship design





Table 3.9 summarizes the calculated effect of the
design-to-cost philosophy on the Patrol Frigate. If the
Patrol Frigate had not been designed in an austere cost
and weight-conscious atmosphere, the ship would probably
have displaced over 4500 tons. Without an austere philosophy
in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the ship
might have had additional weapon systems, especially in the
area of anti-submarine warfare, such as ASROC and the
AN/SQS-26 series sonar system, and additional speed
requirements which could have increased the displacement
above 5000 tons.
Figure 3.12 shows graphically the effect of design-to-
cost. The PF without the austere design-to-cost philosophy,
as calculated in this thesis and shown as squares on this
graph, continues but moderates the trend of increasing ship
size. The present trend, extended to the commissioning
date of the first Patrol Frigate, shows that the latest
escort ship might have displaced 6000 tons if restraint
had not been shown by those involved in planning for the
Patrol Frigate. The analysis in this thesis is considered
to be conservative as explained in Section 3.4.7, and
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Figure 3.12. Effect of Design-to-Cost
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A more accurate analysis, which accounted for the second
and higher order effects and the intangible quantities which
cannot be measured, would show an unconstrained PF to dis-
place between 4600 and 6000 tons.
The five areas discussed in Sections 3.4.2 - 3.4.6 are
primarily under the control of the Chief of Naval Operations.
The ship design manager presents the viable alternatives to
the CNO, but the decision rests with the customer. The
CNO's decisions on payload, propulsion system, manning
policies, and margins account for 730 of the 1020 "tons
"saved" through the design-to-cost efforts. This means
that the ship design agent has very little flexibility in
reducing ship displacement. As the NAVSEC ship design
manager for the Patrol Frigate said; the PF experience
".
. . indicates that a 4% reduction in ship's weight is
about all that can be reasonably expected (excluding costly
concepts like an aluminum hull, etc.). Thus any attempt to
set displacement goals for austere destroyer-type ships
more than 4% below a good conventional estimate of that
ship's displacement according to normal practice is
unreasonable. . . Any further weight reductions would have




While there are limitations to this analysis, there
are two basic conclusions that can be drawn from this
section:
1) The ship design community can design a
small, combatant ship through the rigorous enforcement of
a low cost and weight philosophy of ship design. The trend
to ever-increasing size of naval ships is not irreversible.
2) In order for a small ship design to be
successful, the customer, the Chief of Naval Operations,
must be willing to sacrifice performance in order to achieve
cost reductions. Although the design agent has some control
over the size of the ship, it is the requirements of the
customer which will determine the size of the delivered
ship. It is the duty of the naval ship designer to ensure
that those men who make the performance/cost tradeoff
decisions are fully aware of the implications of their
decisions
.
There is a continuing debate as to whether or not the
Navy should build austere ships. The issues involved with
this debate are beyond the scope of this thesis. In an
effort to place some of these issues in proper perspective,
however, the basic performance characteristics of the
Patrol Frigate are compared with the DE-1052 class Ocean
Escort in Section 3.6. Chapter IV discusses design-to-cost




3.5 Performance of the Patrol Frigate
Analysis of the performance of the Patrol Frigate is
best left to the operations analyst and the ship operator,
However, some general statements can be made to put the
performance characteristics of this ship in perspective with
recent destroyer designs, specifically the DE-1052 class.
Table 3.14 compares the characteristics of the Patrol
Frigate with the DE-1052. The two ships are similar in
size, but the PF is designed primarily for anti-air warfare
and the DE-1052 is designed primarily for anti-submarine
warfare. The PF was designed to operate in conjunction
with an ASW ship carrying an advanced sonar system with an
ASROC (Anti-Submarine ROCket) launcher. In this manner the
PF can help form a team to defend against air, surface, and
submarine attacks. (28) The DE-1052's primary mission is
anti-submarine warfare.
The PF's primary weapons system is the MK 13 Mod 4
launcher that can fire the Standard anti-aircraft missile
and the Harpoon anti-ship missile. The PF carries two
LAMPS (Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System) helicopters and
ship launched torpedoes for anti-submarine warfare.
The Patrol Frigate's sustained speed is 28 knots,





COMPARISON OF PATROL FRIGATE WITH DE-1052 CLASS SHIPS (45)
DE-1052 Class
Full Load Displacement 4100 tons
Internal Volume 481,000 cubic ft,
Length Overall 4 38 ft.
Length on Waterline






































*Space and Weight for Close-in Weapon System (CIWS)
**Depending upon staff and helicopter, requirements
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As compared by Kehoe, the PF has better seakeeping
characteristics than the DE-1052 because the PF does not
have a large sonar dome and because of the PF's high
freeboard. (7) With roll stabilization installed, the PF
will have as good or better seakeeping performance than
most U.S. and U.S.S.R. ships of her approximate displacement.
A superficial look at the performance of the PF
indicates that the ship has not suffered from being a
design-to-cost ship in the areas of speed and seakeeping.
The Patrol Frigate weapon systems appear to be adequate
for her designated missions; however, the ship is susceptible
to many of the criticisms originally levied against the
DE-1052 class, as in the controversy that followed the
publication of "A United States Navy for the Future" in the
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. (19) These were the
requirements of the operating forces, and so this was the
way the ship was designed. The true test of the PF will
come after the ships operate at sea.
3.6 Summary of Chapter III Conclusions
1. The PF weight history shows a continuing battle
to overcome growth in ship system weights. The fact that
ship weights continued to grow, even into detail design,
indicates that early weight estimates were optimistically
low. The errors became apparent as the ship grew in
definition in the progression of design stages.
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2. The PF has the same internal volume, but a dis-
placement of 500 tons less than the DE-1052 class. This
was accomplished through a shift to less dense components
(weapons, propulsion, and personnel) than previous ship
designs. The wider passageways and the tanks for control
of environmental pollution also decrease the density of
the PF.
3. Allocation of weight by function in the PF is
very similar to the DEG-1 class with the exception of a
lower payload weight in the PF. The lower payload weight
is a result of the use of a lightweight gun and a smaller
sonar on the PF.
4. Payload density and engineering plant density
have both decreased primarily as a result of technological
advances. Space and weight per man devoted to personnel
have increased with increasing standards of habitability,
but the percent of the ship devoted to personnel has not
changed appreciably because of the emphasis on reduced
manning. There have been no significant weight savings
from structural innovations on the PF
.
5. Margins were reduced to decrease displacement
wherever reductions could be justified. Subsequent
experience in detail design indicates that some of these
margins should not have been reduced or adjusted. The




6. If the Patrol Frigate had not been designed in an
austere, cost and weight conscious atmosphere whe might have
displaced 4500 tons or more. A twin shaft PF would probably
have displaced over 4900 tons.
7. High standards of habitability and environmental
protection have added about 150 tons to the PF's displacement,
8. Design-to-cost did result in a significantly
smaller ship than might have been expected under previous
design philosophies. The trend to ever increasing ship size
is not irreversible.
9. In order for an austere ship design to be
successful, the customer, the Chief of Naval Operations, must
be willing to sacrifice performance in order to achieve the
desired cost reductions. Although the design agent has some
control over the size of the ship, it is the requirements
of the customer which will determine the size of the
delivered ship.
10. A judgment of the mission effectiveness of the PF
will have to wait for operational evaluation under fleet
conditions. The PF appears to be capable of carrying out the
missions selected for her by the Chief of Naval Operations,
but the ship is susceptable to many of the criticisms of the
DE-1052 Class. The viability of the high-low concept and
the usefullness of an austere escort is a very controversial




DESIGN-TO-COST SINCE THE PF
In addition to the PF, the Navy has designed four
ships under the design-to-cost philosophy, the sea control
ship (SCS), the anti-aircraft destroyer (DG-AEGIS) , a
constrained aircraft carrier (CVX) , and a fleet oiler
(AO-177 class)
.
The sea control ship was envisioned as a very austere
platform from which helicopters and VSTOL aircraft could
operate. This ship was designed with a manning and a cost
constraint; however, the cost constraint was set too loosely
and the design was completed within the constraints without
severely taxing the design engineers. Contract design was
completed, but the detailed design was never funded. The
primary reason given for not funding the SCS was the lack of
an aircraft to use the platform; but because of the lack of
capabilities in the austere design, the SCS was considered
by many to be inadequate to perform the sea control mission.
This ship has been described as a "floating box". (52)
The DG-AEGIS was envisioned as an austere platform
which would have the anti-air defense capabilities of
the AEGIS system. This ship was constrained in dis-
placement and cost. The DG-AEGIS had an original cost
target of 100 million dollars. Feasibility studies
showed that the desired ship could not be built for
less than 125 million, and that became the cost goal
112

for preliminary design. Very detailed and well documented
cost-performance tradeoff studies were conducted in the DG
preliminary design phase. The methodology is described in
the Leopole, Jons, and Drewey paper. (8) The DG completed
preliminary design with a cost estimate of approximately
135 million dollars. Because of the growing cost and
the changing philosophy of the operating forces (see
below) , the DG did not go into contract design.
Constrained aircraft carrier designs have been
started under the titles of CV, CVX, CVL, and continuing
CV. Although feasibility studies have been conducted for
a carrier with a lead ship cost goal of under 550 million
dollars and a tentative conceptual baseline has been
completed, the project has never continued into preliminary
design.
The AG— 177 class was designed as an austere fleet
oiler. As a single mission auxiliary, the oiler did not
present the same degree of conflict in cost versus
performance as is found in combatant ships. The AO-177
class has completed contract design and will be placed
into production when funded by Congress.
The required supporting documentation, so carefully
laid out in the design methodology, has not been followed
in actual practice. The Patrol Frigate Top Level Require-
ments were not signed until the contract for detailed
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design and lead ship construction had been signed. For
the PF, the TLR represented a statement of historical fact,
not a working document. Top level specifications were not
generated for the PF.
The Sea Control Ship was designed without a Top Level
Requirements document; no statement of requirements was
issued. However, the SCS design package did include a set
of Top Level Specifications.
The DG-AEGIS had Top Level Requirements for preliminary
design, but the SHAPM did not allocate funds for the
generation of a Top Level Specification. The design was
dropped before this problem was resolved. (52) The AO-177
class design also had top level requirements, but no
top level specifications.
As can be seen from the fate of the constrained ship
designs, the concept has not been successfully pursued
from design into production in any ship since the Patrol
Frigate.
The primary reason for this is the unwillingness of
the Navy leadership to accept an austere ship design. Both
the DG-AEGIS and the Sea Control designs died because the
ships which could be produced within the desired cost range
were considered inadequate from a performance viewpoint.
Two recent events have served to emphasize this problem,
In August, 1974, Congress passed what is known as the Title
Eight Legislation, requiring the Navy to install nuclear
propulsion in all new construction strike force ships.
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This requirement eliminates all propulsion plant tradeoff
studies and removes the propulsion plant design effort from
the Naval Ship Engineering Center to the Naval Reactors
Division of NAVSEA. The size and weight of a nuclear
reactor requires a large hull and a large initial expense,
and therefore it does not make sense to constrain severely
other areas of the ship design.
The second event is the relief of Admiral Zumwalt by
Admiral Holloway as Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral
Zumwalt was the originator and chief advocate of the con-
strained ship design. He was an "old school" destroyerman
and believed in small ships. Admiral Holloway is nuclear
trained and a former Commanding Officer of the nuclear
carrier ENTERPRISE. He has stated on several occasions
that the Navy needs more offensively capable surface ships.
It is difficult to develop a meaningful design-to-cost
dialogue in a ship design which is pre-determined to be
nuclear powered and have significant offensive capabilities,
Design-to-cost is not dead. The fiscal climate which
provided the impetus for DTC has, if anything, worsened.
The decline in total Navy ships predicted in 1970 has taken
place with only two large shipbuilding programs in
existance, (DD-963 and PF) , to rebuild the surface fleet.
The need for a larger number of ships to carry out the
objectives of national policy still exists. While this
need is partially met by the Patrol Frigate (PF) and the
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Patrol Hydrofoil (PHM) , the force level of the Navy is still
at a very low level. The solution proposed by Admiral
Rickover in the January 1974 Naval Institute Proceedings
to build all nuclear ships is not politically feasible due
to the reluctance of the Congress to increase radically
annual appropriations for ship acquisition. (17) Although
the present philosophy is to build large, nuclear powered,
highly capable escort ships, financial realities will force






5.1 Summary of Conclusions
This thesis has examined the design-to-cost philosophy
as implemented in the design of the Patrol Frigate. The
significant conclusions which have been drawn from this
analysis are as follows:
1) The design-to-cost philosophy departs from previous
design philosophies in two areas:
a) Acquisition costs (defined in a very narrow
sense) and not life cycle costs are optimized.
b) Ship design is not performance optimized.
Performance must be balanced against cost.
2) The design-to-cost philosophy included the imposition
of constraints on full load displacement, follow ship
acquisition cost, and accommodations (maximum manning). The
initial values of these constraints were based more on the
feeling of what was possible than on sound engineering
analysis.
3) Although the Patrol Frigate is a design-to-cost
ship, ship cost was not directly controlled as a design
parameter. System and subsystem cost tradeoffs were made on
the basis of marginal cost factors and cost deltas.
4) The Naval Ship Engineering Center (NAVSEC) used a
complex budget system to control the ship design. The
designers and engineers had not previously worked with a
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design budget, and the effort was only partially successful.
The most significant element in the control of the PF
weight and cost was the existence of a strong Change
Control Board. This board emphasized low cost and low
weight in all phases of the ship design effort and was able
to control the growth of the design. The most successful
tool for design control was the arrangement drawings and
the space budget.
5) The PF weight history shows a continuing battle to
overcome growth in ship system weight. The fact that ship
weights continued to grow, even into detail design,
indicates that early weight estimates were optimistically
low. The errors became apparent as the ship grew in
definition in the progression of design stages.
6) The emphasis on weight control has resulted in the
PF being considerably less dense than other destroyers and
destroyer escorts. The PF has approximately the same
internal volume, but a displacement of 500 tons less than
the DE-1052 class. This was accomplished through a shift
to less dense components (weapons, propulsion, and personnel)
than previous ship designs. The wider passageways and the
tanks for control of environmental pollution also decreases
the density of the PF.
Payload density and engineering plant density have
both decreased, primarily as a result of technological
advances. Space and weight per man devoted to personnel
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have increased with increasing standards of habitability
,
but the percent of the ship devoted to personnel has not
changed appreciably because of the emphasis on reduced
manning. There have been no significant weight savings
from structural innovations on the PF.
7) Calculations have shown that if the Patrol Frigate
had not been designed in an austere atmosphere, she might
have displaced 4500 tons or more. A twin shaft PF would
probably have displaced over 4 900 tons. These estimates
are considered to be conservative.
8) Decisions by the Chief of Naval Operations with
regards to payload, personnel, propulsion, and margins
resulted in the majority of the weight savings. In order
for an austere ship design to be successful, the customer,
the Chief of Naval Operations, must be willing to sacrifice
performance in order to achieve the desired cost reductions
Although the design agent has some control over the size of
the ship, it is the requirements of the customer which will
determine the size of the delivered ship.
9) In spite of problems with the implementation of
design-to-cost, the displacement and cost of the Patrol
Frigate were controlled throughout the preliminary and
contract design phases. Design-to-cost did result in a
significantly smaller ship than might have been expected
under previous design philosophies. That is a significant
victory for design-to-cost. The trend to ever-increasing
ship size is not irreversible.
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10) The future of design-to-cost is clouded by the
Title Eight requirements for nuclear propulsion and the
desire to increase the offensive power of U.S. Naval ships.
Debate over the tradeoff between desired force structure
and available resources is continuing. Some form of
restraint is necessary if the United States is to build
the numbers of ships required to fulfill the nation's
defense requirements. Design-to-cost is one method of
achieving this restraint.
5.2 Recommendations for Further Study
Design-to-cost is a very broad subject. There is a
need for continued research into the effect and usefulness
of design-to-cost as applied to naval ship design. Some
of the areas where further research is desirable include:
1) A more detailed study of the Patrol Frigate should
include the second order effects described in this thesis.
The approximations made in the calculation of the effect of
design-to-cost should be verified.
2) The total effect of design-to-cost should be
verified by a redesign of the PF, including those features
which are listed as austerity measures as an integral part
of the ship design, rather than the cumulative effect used
in this paper.
3) This project should be continued through the
completion of the detail design and construction of the
lead and follow ships. Design-to-cost is only one part of
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the problem of acquisition-to-cost. The problem of maintain-
ing control of the ship design after completion of contract
design requires additional study.
4) Better marginal cost data should be generated to
improve the information used to make ship design tradeoff
decisions.
5) A study similar to this one should be conducted on
the NAVSEC ship designs completed since the PF. Have these
designs benefited from the PF experience? How has design-
to-cost affected the other austere designs? Have the
austerity philosophy and the more careful design procedures
affected ship designs which are not constrained?
6) The relationship between the customer (the CNO) and
the designer (NAVSEC) requires further evaluation and
definition. A rational method of selecting design con-
straints should be developed.
7) The use of margins in ship design requires further
study.
8) The relationship between cost constraints, displace-
ment constraints, manning constraints, acquisition cost,
and life cycle cost requires further study. Is the Navy
saving money by concentrating on a reduction in follow ship
acquisition cost or is the wrong standard being used? This
study should include the effects of aviation components and
the shore-based maintenance facilities which are not
included in the PF follow ship acquisition cost.
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9) A comparison of the design effort required for a
design-to-cost ship design with an unconstrained ship design
could quantify the cost of the design-to-cost effort. From
this study the effort required by design-to-cost could be
justified.
10) There is no standard for judging the "goodness" of
a ship design or of an acquisition program. A set of
standards needs to be developed so that programs can be
evaluated on an objective basis.
11) The usefulness of austere warships should be
studied very carefully. Are the resulting ships capable
of carrying out the missions of the U.S. Navy?
This thesis could not have been completed without the
tremendous amount of documentation now available on recent
ship designs. That documentation should be used to help
make ship design easier and to help design better ships.
It is hoped that the effort which was used to accumulate
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CALCULATION OF DESIGN-TO-COST EFFECTS
This Appendix details the calculations used to
determine the ratios used in the quantification of the
design-to-cost austerity measures and tabulates the impact
of these measures as follows:
1. Calculation of endurance fuel ratio
2. Calculation of indirect weight ratios
3. Calculation of personnel ratio
Table A-l. Summary of Calculated Effect of Design-
to-Cost
Table A-2. Conceptual Design Austerity Measures
Table A- 3. FBL/PABL Engineering Austerity Measures
Table A-4. FBL/PABL Payload Austerity Measures
Table A-5. FBL/PABL Hull Structural Austerity Measures
Table A-6. FBL/PABL Personnel Austerity Measures
Table A-7. Inverse Design-to-Cost Decisions Under
NAVSEC Control
Table A-8. Inverse Design-to-Cost Decisions Not
Under NAVSEC Control
Table A-9. Austerity Decisions Not Quantified
NOTE: The number in front of each item in Tables A-2
through A-9 refers to the tables in Section 3.2. The
starred items indicate those decisions which were reversed
in detail design as described in Section 3.2.
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1. Calculation of Endurance Fuel Ratio
Assumptions
:
Initial displacement: 3500 tons
Endurance Range: 4500 N.M. at 20 kts. (Estimate
in "Jane's Fighting Ships")
Endurance SHP: 9000
New displacement: 4400
Specific fuel consumption at endurance speed:
0.5 pounds fuel/SHP (typical for
LM2500 turbine)




Assume —7— = constant
SHP 9000
A " 3500 ' A '^'
SHPSHP at new displacement = —r— x A = 2.57 x 4900 =
11,300
Endurance fuel at 3500 tons:
tons fuel = SHP x ran9f x sfcspeed




Increase in fuel = 116 tons






NOTE: While the numbers used in the calculation do not
accurately represent the PF, the derived ratio provides a
good approximation for this analysis.
2. Indirect Weight Attributed to Volume Increases
PF DE-1052
1. Hull Structure ( ifr°UP ^ , ) 5.37 6.4 9Total Volume
2. Electrical £r°uP I i ) -67 .56Total Volume
3. Auxiliary (^tal Volume } 1.67 1.61
r, *.*:•* /Non-personnel Gp. 6 X c . , nc
4
'
0utflt ( Total Volume^ > -& ±^.







3. Calculation of Personnel Ratios
Direct Weight
Group 6 weight allocated
to personnel




























Indirect Weight per unit
volume
lb lb
8 .34 ff 3 9.72 fp
Weight effect of personnel
volume








CALCULATED EFFECT OF DESIGN-TO-COST
Conceptual Design (Table A-2) 343.8
FBL/PABL Engineering (A-3) 294.5
FBL/PABL Payload (A-4) 115.4
FBL/PABL Hull (A-5) 31
FBL/PABL Personnel (A-6) 104.4
Endurance Fuel 130
Total Effect +1019.1
PF PABL Displacement (12/72) 3540.
PF without Design-to-Cost emphasis 4559.
1
Effect of Second Shaft + 400
Twin Shaft PF without design-to-cost
emphasis 4959.
Effect of Inverse Design-to-cost
Under NAVSEC Control - 43.5
Not under NAVSEC Control - 170.9
Total Effect - 214.4
PABL Displacement 3540.




CONCEPTUAL DESIGN AUSTERITY MEASURES
Austerity Measures Weight Notes
Savings
(tons)
1. Deletion of Future Change Characteristics
Margin 100 2
2. Reduction in Service Life Margin 95 2
3. Buy Foreign
Gun System (76MM Oto Melara vs. 5"/54 LW) 16.1 2
Fire Control System (Mk 87 vs. Mk 86) 1.5 2
4. Cross utilization of personnel decreasing
manning from 253 to 213 men (40 men) 131.2 2,3
Total 343.8
NOTE: An additional 4 00 tons was saved by selecting single
screw vice twin screw (note 2) . A twin screw ship has little
distinct advantage over a two screw ship in a small combatant
and so it is probable that single screw would have been
selected even without the emphasis on low weight as long as










Deck Area Volume Weight Notes
(sq.ft.) (cu.ft.) (tons)
6. Central Workshop 540
7. Single ship's boat




Removal of 2nd anchor
9. Decrease size of AFFF
stations 60
10. Air compressor selection
11. Replace 600 HP auxiliary
propulsion motor with two
325 HP motors 1174
12. Remove milling machine
14. Remove oil and water
test lab 66
15. Delete main engine
silencers and acoustic
treatment
22. Remove emergency diesel,
substitute 10KW for
250KW diesel 2000
16. Remove one degaussing
coil
17. Reject additional decon
station 20
18. Remove two fire pumps*
























Deck Area Volume Weight
(sq.ft.) (cu. ft. ) (tons)
Notes
20. Deletion of Roll
Stabilization*




13. Replacement of auxiliary
boiler with waste heat
system






























FBL/PABL PAYLOAD AUSTERITY MEASURES
Austerity Measures
SAVINGS
Deck Area Volume Weight Notes
(sq.ft.) (Cu.ft.) (tons)
31. Resize due to sonar
removal
32. Remove TACTLASS
31. Reduce size of sonar
space 192





39. Remove RPS custodian's
office 64
Total Deck Area 266
Volume Effect of Deck Area


















FBL/PABL HULL STRUCTURAL AUSTERITY MEASURES
Austerity Measures
SAVINGS
Deck Area Volume Weight Ref
,
(sq.ft.) (Cu.ft.) (tons)
37. Remove ECM equipment
room on 0-2 level
38. Replace circular chain
lockers with built-in
lockers
39. Remove deck house front,
side bulwarks and fashion
plates
40. Rearrangement of tanks to
save weight
41. Remove unnecessary bulkhead
between Mk92 and CIC cooling
rooms
42. Remove longitudinal bulk-
head aft*

















FBL/PABL PERSONNEL AUSTERITY MEASURES
Austerity Measures
SAVINGS
Deck. Area Volume Weight Ref
(sq.ft.) (cu.ft. ) (tons)
48. CNO decrease in
manning
49. Reject increase in
medical spaces 140
50. Combined Galley 130
51. Remove spare furniture
from XOSR
52. Medical treatment room
doubles as forward
battle dressing station 70










Volume Effect of Deck Area
390
3315 13








INVERSE DTC DECISIONS UNDER NAVSEC CONTROL
Decisions
POSSIBLE SAVINGS
Deck Area Volume Weight Notes
(sq.ft.) (cu.ft.) (tons)
61. Enlarge Office Complex 150
62. Athletic Gear Storeroom 53
63. Passageway/Access Design
64. Ability to Ballast with
fuel tanks













Total Deck Area 203
Volume Effect of Deck Area
Total Deck Area
















(cu. ft. ) (tons)
Notes






69. Oily Waste Holding Tank
70. Clean ballast system
71. CIWS













Total Deck Area 192
Volume effect of Deck Area
Total Volume











AUSTERITY DECISIONS WHICH ARE NOT QUANTIFIED
Notes
5. Reduction in Design and Builders Margin 2
24. Simplified Underway Replenishment System 9
25. Inclusion of Helo Fuel as Part of Endurance
Fuel and Sliding Endurance Displacement
Calculation 9
26. No-Dial Telephone System 9
27. No provision for Pneumatic Tubes for Communications 9
28. Less Severe Noise Requirements than Recent DE's 9
29. No STOPS Treatment of any kind 9
30. Removal of Roll Tank 1-110
34. No Secondary Conning or Lookout Stations 9
44. Extensive use of GRP Topside and in Non-Structural
Materials 9
45. Removal of Unnecessary Watertight Hatches 1-281
46. Reduced Helicopter Platform Structural Design
Criteria 9
47. No External Inclined Ladders





1. Naval Ship Engineering Center, Patrol Frigate Change
Request files for FBL, POST-FBL and PABL. Number
following 1- refers to change request number.
2. Naval Ship Systems Command/ Patrol Escort Concept
Exploration Report (U) , July 1971.
3. Weight savings for personnel is calculated as:
3.28 tons per man direct weight; 6 04 cubic feet of space
per man
4. Naval Ship Systems Command, Patrol Frigate Ship
Acquisition Plan, June 1973.
5. Naval Ship Engineering Center, Design Decision Presenta-
tion Brief, "Electrical Generator Selection",
December 10, 1971.
6. Guided Missile Frigate (FFG-7) , Weight Report, March,
1975.
7. Personal correspondence with Captain V.R. Milano, USN,
NAVSEC, March 24, 1975.
8. Gibbs and Cox, Analysis of a Waste Heat System for
Application to the Patrol Frigate, January 30, 1973.
9. Naval Ship Engineering Center, Technical Design History
of Patrol Frigate, Rough Draft, January, 1975.
10. Naval Ship Engineering Center, PABL Design History
Summary for Structural Design, December 12, 1972.
(This history states that stress margin was decreased
from 1.0 tsi to .75 tsi less than the design primary stress
because little future displacement growth is planned. The
limiting primary stress is 8.5 tsi so this change was
assumed to decrease structural weight in groups 100 and 101
by
trl = 2 - 9% -
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11. CNO/VCNO Action Sheet 836-71 of October 18, 1971.
12. Naval Ship Systems Command, DE-1052 Contract Plans,
April, 1964.
13. Assumed average deck height of 8.5 feet.
14. Assumed weight effect of 8.34 #/ft 3 enclosed
volume from page 131.
15. Naval Ship Engineering Center, Patrol Frigate Top
Level Requirements Draft dated November 21, 1974.
16. Naval Ship Engineering Center, Ship Space Classification
Data, March, 1970.
17. Assume same percent devoted to passage and access as in
DEG-1.
18. Difference between PF pantry and DE-1052 wardroom galley,
19. Telcon with R. Steward, NAVSEC SHAPM Support Manager,
April 3, 1975.




CLASSIFICATION OF COST ESTIMATES
This appendix defines the classification of cost
estimates as used by the U. S. Navy and set forth in
OPNAVINST 7720.2, Classification of SCN Cost Estimates. (26)
1. Class A - Detailed Cost Estimate
An extensive cost estimate prepared to validate an end
cost estimate; for determination of a "fair and reasonable"
price for comparison to contractors prices; but primarily
for contract negotiation purposes. It is always prepared in
the post-budget process and generally prior to a bid opening
or scheduled negotiation and fixed price incentive or cost
plus type contracts. This level of cost estimate requires
contract plans and specifications and a detailed contract
design weight estimate as inputs from the design process.
The cost and economic inputs are primarily unit material
and man-hour cost estimating relationships developed to the
NAVSHIPS Consolidated Index of Materials breakdown (3 digit
level) of costs, vendor quotations for all major material
items and a thorough analysis of the competitiveness of the
market, expected labor and profit rates, escalation, etc.
Due to the extensiveness of the estimate, requiring in
excess of five weeks of development and calculation of data,
this type of estimate is only prepared when conditions so
warrant such a level of detail.
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2. Class B - Bid Evaluation Estimate
An estimate prepared to validate the "reasonableness"
of cost estimates received from contractors or government
shipyards. Prepared immediately prior to a bid opening or
upon receipt of an initial cost estimate from a naval
shipyard.
The scope is similar to a Class A Cost Estimate except
that the estimate is not as detailed. Unlike the Class A
Detailed Cost Estimate, material quotations are not
necessarily obtained from industry; and the cost estimating
relationships used reflect a higher degree of aggregation.
3. Class C - Budget Quality Estimate
These are considered to be the highest level of cost
estimates attainable in the planning, programming and
budgeting process since the more extensive Class A and
Class B estimates are considered post-budget estimates. A
Class C estimate is the recommended level for estimates of
cost to be used in the budget submission especially at the
Congressional level, preferably for the NAVCOMPT and
OSD/BOB submissions and whenever feasible for the Program
Objective estimates for the current budget year.
SCB Approved Characteristics with appended electronic
requirement and weapon installation plans are a requirement.
In addition, special items not necessarily included in the
SCB approved characteristics, such as, extent of automation,
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hull materials, shock level, silencing requirements, selected
system engineering requirements and other unique or special
items should be known.
For conversion estimates to conform to this classifica-
tion, the detailed scope of the complete ship rearrangements
and relocations as well as a survey of the repair status;
time since previous overhaul; outstanding ship alterations;
history of previous rehabilitation costs on similar ship
type conversions, etc. must be available.
Equipment, allowances and other costs obtained outside
of NAVSHIPS must be documented by official memoranda. The
electronics, ordnance, propulsion, etc., should be sufficiently
defined and developed technologically to eliminate any
inordinately high developmental costs. If items of uncer-
tainty do exist, appropriate growth factors must be
included and the cost estimate classification additionally
noted. The cost estimating relationships (CER) used in
the estimate should be based on reliable design and cost
data (accepted weight estimate and contract bid information
or naval shipyard return cost data be available)
.
If the design, technical or cost information is lacking
credibility or in the opinion of the cost estimator signifi-
cant information is questionable, the cost estimate is to be
classified at some lower level.
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4. Class D - Feasibility Estimate
An estimate of a lower quality than a Class C estimate
due to an insufficiency in the design, procurement or cost
information primarily the result of a need for an estimate
before such information can be further developed to justify
a C classification. Such early estimates are usually ex-
ploratory in nature and are prepared to perform trade-offs
and cost effectiveness analysis, to establish notional ship
characteristics and for costing the Program Objectives in
the out-years where there is an absence of sufficient design
development.
Generally, the primary design input for a Class D
estimate will be SCB Feasibility and Cost Study Characteris-
tics (single sheet) as opposed to the SCB Approved
Characteristics included in Class C estimates. Cost
estimates derived solely by a plus and minus technique from
a higher quality estimate or from a repeat design where
SCB guidance on the project deletes or adds characteristics
which have a potential impact or significantly altering the
design configuration are considered to be a feasibility
estimate due to the lack of sufficient design development.
Since cost estimates, as developed for a ship type under
Contract Definition, are almost always subject to change
upon receipt of the contractor's design package, the design
information supporting this category of cost estimates can
be considered to be only preliminary in nature; and the cost
estimate should, therefore, be included in this classification
148

5. Class E - Computer Estimate
An estimating process when cost and design information
is developed by use of a computer model which grossly
determines ship specifications from a given set of input
characteristics. In general, the output cost and design
information is calculated from estimating relationships
through a series of equations while payload type items
such as electronics, ordnance, etc., are costed by a
shopping list technique within the model.
Present applications of this type of cost estimate are
for parametric cost studies, where relative costs and not
absolute costs are primarily considered, and for estimates
of ships which are in the conceptual design stage.
6. Class F - "Ball Park" Estimate
Quick cost estimates are those prepared in the absence
of the minimum design and cost information package and are
based on gross approximate parameters. Typically, estimates
are generally calculated by merely escalating to current
dollars an empirical cost for a similar ship and adding
factors for expected changes in design, accounting procedures






AFFF Aqueous Film Forming Foam (fire fighting system)
ASROC Anti-Submarine Rocket
ASW Ant i-Submarine Warfare
CFE Contractor Furnished Equipment
CGN Nuclear Guided Missile Cruiser
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
DCP Development Concept Paper
DD Destroyer
DDG Guided Missile Destroyer
DDS Design Data Sheet
DE Destroyer Escort (Now FF)
DEG Guided Missile Destroyer Escort (Now FFG)
DG-AEGIS AEGIS-Guided Missile Weapon System-equipped
Destroyer
DLGN Nuclear Guided Missile Frigate (Now CGN)
DOD Department of Defense
DSARC Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
FBL Functional Baseline
FF Frigate
FFG Guided Missile Frigate
FSABL Follow Ship Allocated Baseline
GFE Government Furnished Equipment
GFI Government Furnished Information
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LAMPS Light Airborne Multipurpose Systems (Shipboard
helicopter system)
LSABL Lead Ship Allocated Baseline
NAVMAT Naval Material Command
NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command
NAVSEC Naval Ship Engineering Center
NAVSHIPS Naval Ship Systems Command, now a part of NAVSEA
OPNAV Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
PABL Preliminary Allocated Baseline
PF Patrol Frigate (Now FFG)
PMS-399 Patrol Frigate Designated Project Manager
SCS Sea Control Ship
SECNAV Secretary of the Navy
SHAPM Ship Acquisition Project Manager
TLR Top Level Requirements







Qi HVh * * *
teAPWTft "^2 32 6 1
7 NOV 78 J ' c
("Thesis
N53 Nickel sburg
The impact of des.gn






-> FEB 76 %












The impact of design
to cost on naval ship
design.
,hesN53
aH of design to cost
on naval sh
The impact t
o » a
VuDLEVKNOXUBBABY
